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Comments I
Reining in Rambo: Prosecuting Crimes
Committed by American Military
Contractors in Iraq
Christopher D. Belen*
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 16, 2007, American civilians shot and killed
seventeen Iraqi civilians on a Baghdad street.' The heavily armed
Americans were not tourists or ordinary criminals; they were employed
by Blackwater USA, a State Department contractor, and paid to protect
the United States Embassy and diplomatic corps in Baghdad.2 Although
the reports and investigations consistently concluded the shooting was at
least excessive, 3 the possible criminal liability of the individual shooters
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University. I thank my wife, Erika, for her steadfast patience and support. I dedicate this
article to my son and the next generation of public servants.
1. See James Glanz & Alissa J. Rubin, From Errand to Fatal Shot To Hail of Fire
to 17 Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at A1, available at 2007 WLNR 19321232.
2. See generally David Johnston & John M. Broder, F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14
Iraqis Without Cause, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2007, at Al, available at 2007 WLNR
22473928.
3. See Johnston & Broder, supra note 2; Sudarsan Raghavan, Joshua Partlow &
Karen DeYoung, Blackwater Faulted in Military Reports From Shooting Scene, WASH.
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was less than certain because of the foreign location and the unique
relationship between the State Department contractors and the U.S.
military mission in Iraq.4 The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
("MEJA"),5 authorizes criminal charges in the United States for certain
foreign conduct by civilians.6 This statute, however, does not necessarily
apply to an entity operating under a contract with a federal agency other
than the Department of Defense ("DoD").7 Even if a federal court
theoretically could exercise jurisdiction over the conduct, some of the
likely defendants were granted a form of immunity during the
investigation that would present another significant obstacle to a
successful prosecution.
8
If criminal prosecution in a United States District Court is unlikely,
the other options-court-martial or prosecution in an Iraqi court-suffer
from their own flaws.9 The Supreme Court historically has expressed
concern over subjecting civilians to the military justice system and, if
faced with this issue, the Court may strike down Congress's recent grant
of court-martial jurisdiction over most private military contractors.10 The
Iraqi legal system likely is not available because the transitional
government granted immunity to private contractors and the successive
POST, Oct. 5, 2007, at Al, available at 2007 WLNR 19494935; Sudarsan Raghavan &
Josh White, Blackwater Guards Fired at Fleeing Cars, Soldiers Say, WASH. POST, Oct.
12, 2007, at Al, available at 2007 WLNR 19996779.
4. See generally John M. Broder & James Risen, Armed Guards In Iraq Occupy a
Legal Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2007, at Al, available at 2007 WLNR 18400367.
By mid-November, the F.B.I. had concluded an investigation into the shooting. See
Johnston & Broder, supra note 2. Reports also indicate a grand jury had convened. See
David Johnston & David M. Broder, US. Prosecutors Subpoena Blackwater Employees,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2007, at A10, available at 2007 WLNR 22942576. According to at
least one report, the Department of Justice has acknowledged the "major legal obstacles"
outlined in this Comment but, in spite of these difficulties, the Department believes the
obstacles are "not insurmountable." See James Risen & David Johnston, Justice
Department Briefed Congress on Legal Obstacles in Blackwater Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 2008, at A10, available at 2008 WLNR 844931.
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
6. See infra Part III.A.1-2 (discussing origins and purpose of the MEJA).
7. See Broder & Risen, supra note 4; All Things Considered: Questions Swirl
Around Blackwater Shooting (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 18, 2007) [hereinafter Silliman
interview] (interviewing Scott Silliman, Executive Director of Duke Law School's Center
on Law, Ethics, and National Security).
8. See Jonathan Karl & Kirit Radia, Exclusive: ABC News Obtains Text of
Blackwater Immunity Deal, ABC NEWS, Oct. 30, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/Story?id=3795318&page=l; see also infra Part V.B.
9. See infra Parts II.B, IV (describing options for court-martial jurisdiction and
recourse to the Iraqi legal system); infra Part V.A.1 (discussing contractors' immunity
from the Iraqi legal process); infra Part V.A.3 (discussing merits of applying court-
martial jurisdiction to private military contractors).
10. See infra Part III.B.2.
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Iraqi government did not repeal the measure.'1 It may be of little
comfort to the victims, but if the Blackwater shooters avoid criminal
prosecution, they will likely be the last proverbial horses that escape
through the legal barn door. 12 After the tragedy in Nisour Square, the
United States House of Representatives passed legislation that could
clarify the scope of the MEJA's application to private contractors,' 3 and
the Iraqi government approved a draft law that would repeal the primary
obstacle to hailing a wrongdoer into an Iraqi court.14
Part II of this Comment describes the Nisour Square incident,
Blackwater's role in Iraq, and the jurisdictional gap that may allow the
shooters to escape criminal liability. 15  Part III reviews the various
options for prosecuting the shooters under U.S. law. Part IV describes
the source of possible immunity from Iraqi law. Part V analyzes the
implications of the ambiguities in U.S. law, the likelihood of immunity
from liability in the Iraqi legal system, and the future impact of recent
developments. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that the ambiguous
legal foundation for prosecution of private security contractors could
allow for prosecution of the shooters but would require an expansive
interpretation of U.S. law.
11. See infra Parts IV.C, V.A.1.
12. See Frederick A. Stein, Have We Closed the Barn 'Door Yet? A Look At the
Current Loopholes In the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 27 Hous. J. INT'L L.
579 (2005) (employing the "barn door" metaphor).
13. See Matt Kelley, House Tries to Clarify Contracting Rules Under Bill, Guards
Could Be Subject to Prosecution, USA TODAY, Oct. 5, 2007, at 6A, available at 2007
WLNR 19506479; see also infra Part V.C. 1.
14. See, e.g., Alissa J. Rubin, Iraqi Cabinet Votes to End Security Firms' Immunity,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2007, at A10, available at 2007 WLNR 21427708; see also infra
notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
15. This Comment evaluates the options for criminal prosecution of the Blackwater
shooters but it does not address the civil liability of the shooters or their employer. The
victims of the Blackwater incident discussed in this Comment will likely pursue civil
claims against the corporation and individual actors. Indeed, one survivor and several
family members of the victims filed such a civil suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia less than one month after the shooting. See Press Release,
Center for Constitutional Rights, Blackwater USA Sued For Firing On Iraqi Civilians,
According to Legal Team for Injured Survivor and Families of Three Killed (Oct. 11,
2007), available at http://ccrjustice.org (search "Search this site" for "blackwater
atban"). For a discussion of civil liability of private security contractors, see, for
example, Kateryna L. Rakowsky, Military Contractors and Civil Liability: Use of the
Government Contractor Defense to Escape Allegations of Misconduct in Iraq and
Afghanistan, 2 STAN. J. Civ. RTS. & Civ. LIB. 365 (2006); Valerie C. Charles, Note, Hired
Guns and Higher Law: A Tortured Expansion of the Military Contractor Defense, 14
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 593 (2006) (analyzing civil claims against contractors
involved in the interrogation of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison); Posting of Laura
Dickinson to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com (Oct. 7, 2007, 21:44 EDT).
2008]
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II. BACKGROUND
A. September 16, 2007
Just after noon,' 6 shots rang out in Nisour 7 Square.' 8 Gunfire
sprayed in all directions after a caravan of black SUVs barreled into the
traffic circle at the center of this western Baghdad neighborhood.' 9 The
SUVs' occupants were employees of Blackwater USA, a private military
20contractor. Reports described the chaotic scene and the
indiscriminate 21 and excessive22 shooting that resulted in the deaths of
seventeen Iraqi civilians.23
16. See James Glanz & Sabrina Tavernise, Blackwater Role in Shooting Said To
Include Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007, at Al, available at 2007 WLNR 18998874
(reporting the shooting in Nisour Square began at 12:08 p.m.).
17. As is often the case with words translated from Arabic to English, there are
alternative spellings of the location of the incident. E.g., Stefanie Balogh, Hired Guns
Help Wage War In Iraq, ADVERTISER (Aus.), Oct. 6, 2007, at 72, available at 2007
WLNR 19550560 (naming location as "Nissor Square"); Posting of Scott Horton to
Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com (Dec. 19, 2007, 15:42 EST) (using "Nisoor
Square"). Following the lead of the New York Times, this Comment uses "Nisour
Square." E.g., Glanz & Rubin, supra note 1 (spelling location "Nisour Square").
18. See Glanz & Rubin, supra note 1.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. (reporting more than 40 bullet holes found in one car). Early reports
mentioned a mother shot while cradling her infant son. See, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise &
James Glanz, Iraqi Report Says Blackwater Guards Fired First, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
2007, at A12, available at 2007 WLNR 18318204. Subsequent reporting, however,
clarified the woman's son was an adult named Ahmed Haithem Ahmed. See Glanz &
Rubin, supra note 1. The confusion may be blamed on the charred remains of Mr.
Ahmed's body, burned after a Blackwater guard allegedly fired a grenade into the
lurching car. See id.
22. See Johnston & Broder, supra note 2 (quoting anonymous official's statement, "I
wouldn't call it a massacre, but to say it was unwarranted is an understatement");
Raghavan & White, supra note 3 (quoting Army eyewitnesses describing the conduct of
Blackwater guards as "excessive shooting").
23. The number of civilian deaths fluctuated in the early days of reporting. The first
round of reports stated that at least eight Iraqis were killed during the incident. See, e.g.,
Sabrina Tavernise, Maliki Alleges 7 Cases When Blackwater Killed Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2007, at A6, available at 2007 WLNR 18400286. One week after the shooting,
reports claimed at least eleven civilians were killed. See Steve Fainaru & Sudarsan
Raghavan, Blackwater Faced Bedlam, Embassy Finds, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2007, at
Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2007/09/27/
AR2007092702498.html; Alissa J. Rubin & Andrew E. Kramer, Iraqi Premier Says
Blackwater Shootings Challenge His Nation's Sovereignty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007,
at A6, available at 2007 WLNR 18689465. A report prepared by the Iraqi Ministry of
the Interior claimed twenty civilians were killed. See Tavernise & Glanz, supra note 21.
By early October, however, reports consistently cited seventeen deaths. See, e.g., James
Glanz & Alissa J. Rubin, Blackwater Shootings 'Deliberate Murder,' Iraq Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2007, at A6, available at 2007 WLNR 19682874; Glanz & Rubin, supra
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At least one report claims the incident escalated when a motorist
was shot fatally in the head, slumped forward, and was unable to stop his
car. 24  As the car rolled toward the Blackwater convoy, the guards
opened fire. 25  Blackwater guards claimed they acted in self-defense,
firing only after they were fired upon.26 The resulting investigations,
however, concluded no shots were fired at the convoy.27
B. Blackwater's Security Services Contract In Iraq
At the time of the Nisour Square incident,28 Blackwater 29 operated
in Iraq under a "personal protective services" contract with the U.S.
Department of State.30  The State Department, for the purpose of
personal protection of high-level officials, contracted with three private
security contractors under a Worldwide Personal Protective Services
contract ("WPPS II",).31 At the end of September 2007, 1433 people
worked under the WPPS II contract worldwide; of those, 1261--or 88
percent-worked in Iraq.32  In 2007, the total annual costs for the
note 1; Christine Hauser, New Rules for Contractors Are Urged by 2 Democrats, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at A23, available at 2007 WLNR 19407141.
24. See Glanz & Rubin, supra note 1. The same report alleges a Blackwater guard
shot the driver. Id.
25. See id.
26. See Sabrina Tavernise, U.S. Contractor Banned by Iraq Over Shootings, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007, at A l, available at 2007 WLNR 18229807 (quoting a Blackwater
spokeswoman who said, "The 'civilians' reportedly fired upon by Blackwater
professionals were in fact armed enemies, and Blackwater personnel returned defensive
fire.... Blackwater professionals heroically defended American lives in a war zone.");
see also Fainaru & Raghavan, supra note 23 (citing initial U.S. Embassy "spot report"
that quoted witnesses' account of shots fired at convoy).
27. See Johnston & Broder, supra note 2; Tavernise & Glanz, supra note 21.
28. See supra Part II.A (describing the events of September 16, 2007).
29. For an extensive but critical study of Blackwater, see JEREMY SCAHILL,
BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL MERCENARY ARMY (2007).
30. See, e.g., Sean McCormack, Department of State Daily Press Briefing (Sept. 19,
2007), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/sep/92462.htm (answering reporters'
questions regarding the State Department's reaction to the Nisour Square incident);
James Risen, State Dept. Starts Third Review of Private Security in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 29, 2007, at A5, available at 2007 WLNR 19068427 (discussing State
Department's review of its contracts with Blackwater); see also John F. Bums, The
Deadly Game of Private Security, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, at 41, available at 2007
WLNR 18642345 (describing work of private military contractors in Iraq, specifically
citing Blackwater's "State Department contract to protect American officials, including
the ambassador").
31. Hearing on Private Security Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight & Gov 't Reform, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Griffin], available
at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20071002145249.pdf (statement of Ambassador
Richard J. Griffin, Assistant Secretary of State).
32. Id.
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WPPS II contract worldwide were $570,882,962 of which
$472,705,65 1-or 83 percent-is allocated to Blackwater. 33
C. The Loophole Revealed
Commentators describe the legal status or posture of private
military contractors as a jurisdictional "no man's land, 34 gap, or
loophole.36 After the Nisour Square incident, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice acknowledged the "hole" in U.S. law, and urged
Congress to act.37 This opinion reflects a belief that even the statute
intended to prevent this loophole-the MEJA 3 8 -is not up to the task
because it suffers from ambiguous and outdated definitions of the
persons covered by the Act. 39  The MEJA extended federal court
jurisdiction to include U.S. civilians who commit felonies while
employed by or accompanying the military overseas. 40  The MEJA,
therefore, may not cover the Blackwater shooters because their State
Department contract 41 did not explicitly relate to ongoing military
operations in Iraq.42 The prospect of the MEJA's inapplicability leads to
consideration of other avenues of criminal liability: court-martial
jurisdiction or criminal charges in Iraq.43 Either option, however,
includes obstacles.
33. Id.
34. See Katherine Jackson, Not Quite a Civilian, Not Quite a Soldier: How Five
Words Could Subject Civilian Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan to Military
Jurisdiction, 27 J. NAT'L ASs'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 255, 269 (2007).
35. See, e.g., Glenn R. Schmitt, Closing the Gap in Criminal Jurisdiction Over
Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces Abroad - A First Person Account of the
Creation of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 51 CATH. U. L. REv. 55
(2001).
36. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 12.
37. See John M. Broder, Rice Says 'Hole' in U.S. Law Shields Contractors in Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2007, at A6, available at 2007 WL 21088393 (reporting on
Secretary Rice's testimony before a congressional committee).
38. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
39. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 34; Peter W. Singer, Frequently Asked Questions
on the UCMJ Change and Its Applicability to Private Military Contractors, Jan. 12,
2007, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0112defenseindustry-singer.aspx.
40. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267.
41. See Griffin, supra note 31 (describing the responsibilities of the WPPS II
contractors).
42. The MEJA covers non-DoD contractors to the extent that their work supports the
mission of the military overseas. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1); see also infra Part III.A.3
(discussing this expanded version of the MEJA); infra Part V.A.2 (applying the MEJA to
the Blackwater shooters involved in the Nisour Square incident).
43. Some observers have advocated other options as preferable to the MEJA. See
infra note 50 (explaining this Comment's focus on the MEJA and mentioning two other
avenues). Professor Jordan Paust, for example, concluded prosecution under the MEJA
was too problematic and, instead, advocated prosecuting the Blackwater shooters under
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First, courts have not yet reviewed the recent legislation authorizing
courts-martial for civilian contractors associated with military operations
and, considering the U.S. Supreme Court's precedent, the measure's
constitutionality is questionable. 4  The second option, criminal charges
under Iraqi law, is likely precluded because the Coalition Provisional
Authority ("CPA") granted immunity to contractors; the successive Iraqi
government did not repeal the grant of immunity. 45 Unless the United
States waives Blackwater's immunity under this order,46 the Iraqi legal
system is likely unavailable. 47 Therefore, the best starting point is to
review the possible applicability of U.S. law to the Blackwater shooters
involved in the Nisour Square incident.
III. PROSECUTION UNDER U.S LAW
There are two primary options for prosecuting the Blackwater
shooters under U.S. law: criminal prosecution under the MEJA48 or
court-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ").
49
But Blackwater's status as a private military contractor with the State
Department may preclude either option.
the War Crimes Act ("WCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000), or other federal statutes that
criminalize violations of the laws of war. See Jordan Paust, Op-Ed., Prosecuting
Blackwater Personnel, JURIST-FORUM, Oct. 5, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/
2007/10/prosecuting-blackwater-personnel.php. Although there may be merit to
considering these options, I disagree with Professor Paust's analysis of the MEJA. See
id. (concluding Blackwater personnel are not "employed by" the military under the
MEJA because they are State Department contractors and arguing the MEJA may apply
because Blackwater contractors were "accompanying" military). This argument is
addressed infra. See infra notes 80, 321 (rebutting Paust's conclusion); see also infra
Part III.A (discussing the MEJA's expanded scope after the 2004 amendment that tried to
close the gaps in the Act's original language); infra Part V.A.2 (applying the current
provision to the Nisour Square incident). I also disagree with his conclusion that federal
court prosecution based on the Geneva Conventions as implicated by the WCA would be
"far easier." See Paust, supra. To the contrary, I believe the MEJA presents the strongest
case among these options. See infra note 50; cf Anthony E. Giardino, Note, Using
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Prosecute Violations of the Law of War: Looking Beyond
the War Crimes Act, 48 B.C. L. REV. 699 (2007) (discussing the MEJA and court-martial
jurisdiction as alternatives to prosecution under the WCA).
44. See generally Jackson, supra note 34 (reviewing the Supreme Court's previous
treatment of civilian court-martial in light of the recent legislation expanding court-
martial jurisdiction during a "contingency operation" by the military).
45. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the source of potential immunity); infra Part
V.A. 1 (analyzing the application of the immunity to the Blackwater shooters involved in
the Nisour Square incident).
46. See infra Part IV.C.4 (describing the Sending States' right to waive immunity).
47. See discussion infra Part V.A. 1.
48. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
49. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000).
2008]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
A. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
The MEJA is the primary statutory vehicle for criminal prosecution
of private military contractors.50 When the MEJA was originally passed
in 2000, Congress believed it closed an accountability gap, authorizing
prosecution of Americans who commit serious crimes while overseas.51
What emerged, however, was a well-intended law too ambiguous to
apply to those who contracted with non-DoD agencies.52
1. Original Passage
Almost forty years after the United States Supreme Court struck
down court-martial jurisdiction over civilians, even if the defendant was
a DoD employee or the dependent of a deployed service member,53
Congress acted 54 to fill the gaping jurisdictional hole, which allowed
50. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267. Although other statutes such as the Special Maritime
and Territorial Jurisdiction Act ("SMTJ"), 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2000), and the WCA, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2441 (2000), are arguably available for similar conduct, the narrow focus and specific
intent of the MEJA to apply criminal jurisdiction to foreign conduct by private
contractors warrants the special attention given by this Comment. For a discussion of the
applicability of these other statutes to a scenario similar to the Nisour Square incident,
see William C. Peters, On Law, Wars, and Mercenaries: The Case for Courts-Martial
Jurisdiction over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in Iraq, 2006 BYU L. REV. 367 (2006)
(using a hypothetical involving a detainee who dies while held captive by civilian
contractors assigned to interrogate the detainee); Giardino, supra note 43 (comparing the
relative merits of the SMTJ, WCA, and MEJA).
51. See H.R. REP. No. 106-778, at 4-5 (2000); JENNIFER K. ELSEA & NINA M.
SERAFINO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ:
BACKGROUND, LEGAL STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES (2007), available at
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf; Schmitt, supra note 35.
52. See discussion infra at Part III.A.2-3.
53. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding no court-martial jurisdiction over
civilian family members accompanying servicemembers overseas); United States ex rel.
Toth v. Quarles, 351 U.S. 487 (1956) (striking down application of the UCMJ to persons
who were no longer members of the military); see also H.R. REP. No. 106-778, at 7 & n.8
(citing Reid as a case that "severely limited the application" of the UCMJ to civilians);
Schmitt, supra note 35 (discussing line of cases striking down court-martial jurisdiction
over civilians). In addition to the Supreme Court decisions, the United States Court of
Military Appeals limited military court-martial jurisdiction in United States v. Averette,
19 C.M.A. 363 (1970), available at 1970 WL 7355. The court in Averette held that
court-martial jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the military in a "time of war" was
limited to periods of declared war and not a contingency operation. Id. at 365; see also
10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2000) (authorizing court-martial for some civilians in "time of
war").
54. Glenn Schmitt served as counsel to the House Judiciary Committee from 1994 to
2001 and he helped draft the legislation that became the MEJA. See generally Schmitt,
supra note 35. Schmitt recounted the history of the MEJA in a comprehensive article
written from his behind-the-scenes perspective. See id. In his unique account of the
drafting and passage of the MEJA, Schmitt claims Congress tried to pass such a bill for
over forty years. See id. at 73-74 & n. 135. According to Schmitt, "at least twenty-seven
[Vol. 17:1
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even serious crimes to go unpunished.55 The original impetus behind the
MEJA was to provide a vehicle for prosecuting crimes against
Americans or against American property.56
One observer attributes the interest of a primary sponsor of the bill
to an enlisted constituent whose daughter was molested by another
soldier's son while the families were stationed in Germany.57 When the
victim's father was told no charges could be filed because of the lack of
federal jurisdiction for crimes against civilians overseas, 58 the Senator's
office became involved and, ultimately, the MEJA was drafted, debated,
passed, and signed by President Clinton 59 to ensure that such a crime
would be punished.6 °
On its face, the text of the MEJA was simple. The MEJA created a
new federal crime6' for a specific category of conduct,62 with two
different bills were introduced" over this time. Id. at 74 n.135 (identifying a
"representative sample" of the bills).
55. In a 1979 report, the General Accounting Office ("GAO"), now the Government
Accountability Office, found that host nations prosecuted DoD civilian employees for
200 serious crimes in 1977 but host nations did not prosecute civilians in fifty-nine
serious cases. See H.R. REP. No. 106-778, at 8 (citing COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S.,
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS: SOME CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED
OVERSEAS BY DOD CIVILIANS ARE NOT BEING PROSECUTED: LEGISLATION IS NEEDED
(1979) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]). According to the GAO report, the serious crimes
that slipped through the legal gap included "manslaughter, rape, arson, robbery, and
burglary." See Schmitt, supra note 35, at 74 (citing GAO REPORT, supra).
56. See H.R. REP. No. 106-778, at 10 (identifying civilians' connection with military
and the need to protect American civilians and American property as justifications for the
MEJA); Schmitt, supra note 35, at 55 (recognizing the inability of host nations to
prosecute crimes against Americans or against American property).
57. See Schmitt, supra note 35, at 80.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 80-113 (describing in detail the legislative path of the MEJA).
60. The MEJA confers jurisdiction to a United States District Court only if the
conduct is not prosecuted by other means. See 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000). If, for example,
the host nation prosecutes the offense, the MEJA is not applicable unless otherwise
authorized by the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3261(b); see also H.R. REP. No. 106-778, at 11; Schmitt, supra note 35, at 116
(discussing this provision). In addition, if the conduct results in court-martial under the
UCMJ, the MEJA does not apply to authorize a criminal trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3261(d);
H.R. REP. No. 106-778, at 11 (explaining the bill that became the MEJA only applies if
the perpetrator is "not tried for their crimes under the UCMJ and who later cease to be
subject to the UCMJ (e.g., because the case was not solved before they were discharged
from the military, or because the person is no longer on active duty)").
61. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-778, at 10 (describing the MEJA as creating a new
federal crime). According to Glenn Schmitt, there was debate at the time of the bill's
consideration whether the MEJA created a new crime or merely extended federal courts'
jurisdiction for other federal crimes. See Schmitt, supra note 35, at 114. Although the
bill's drafters believed the legislation created a new crime, DoD staffers were not initially
convinced. See id. Schmitt argued crimes under the MEJA are similar to those
"assimilative crimes" under the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2000),
whereby federal prosecutors can incorporate by reference provisions of state criminal
2008]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
categories of potential perpetrators. 63 Under the MEJA, "conduct outside
the United States that would constitute an offense punishable by
imprisonment for more than 1 year if the conduct had been engaged in
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States" is a federal crime.64 The civilians covered by the MEJA are those
persons who, at the time of the conduct, were either "employed by the
Armed Forces outside the United States" or accompanying the Armed
Forces.65 The original MEJA defined "employed by the Armed Forces"
to include civilian employees, DoD contractors, or employees of a DoD
contractor.66 The second category of persons who may be covered by the
MEJA-persons "accompanying" the military abroad-covered
dependents of a service member, civilian DoD employee, or DoD
67
contractor. Notwithstanding this straightforward statutory scheme, the
MEJA suffers from ambiguities in the language that defines the Act's
scope.
statutes even where no corresponding federal crime exists. See Schmitt, supra note 35, at
114; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-778, at 15 (comparing the effect of the MEJA to the
Federal Assimilative Crimes Act). Schmitt claims this analogy persuaded the DoD. See
Schmitt, supra note 35, at 114. Nonetheless, the issue whether the MEJA is an
independent federal crime or merely a jurisdictional provision is yet another soft spot in
the MEJA that has not been explored due to the lack of enforcement under the Act. See
infra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a) (2000) (limiting scope of the MEJA to those offenses "that
would constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year if the
conduct had been engaged in within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States").
63. Id. (applying the MEJA to persons employed by or accompanying the Armed
Forces overseas or an enlisted person). The MEJA only applies to enlisted personnel if
the person ceases to be subject to the UCMJ due to discharge from the military, see id.
§ 3261(d)(1), or if the charging instrument alleges the enlisted defendant committed the
act with another person who is not subject to the UCMJ, see id. § 3261(d)(2). In this
regard, the MEJA attempts to foreclose a scenario where conduct committed while still a
member of the Armed Forces does not go unpunished merely because, at the time charges
are brought, the defendant is no longer a member of the Armed Forces and not subject to
the UCMJ. See H.R. REP. No. 106-778, at 4-5.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a).
65. Id. § 3261(a)(1). The MEJA also applies to persons who were enlisted in the
Armed Forces at the time of the conduct, but who are no longer enlisted and, therefore,
are not subject to court-martial. See supra note 63.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3267(l)(A) (2000), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 3267(l)(A) (Supp. V
2005). In addition, but not relevant to this Comment, the MEJA's definition of
"employed by the Armed Forces" requires that the person is "present or residing outside
the United States in connection with such employment," 18 U.S.C. § 3267(l)(B) (2000),
and is "not a national of or ordinarily resident in the host nation," id. § 3267(1)(C).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3267(2)(A) (2000). In addition, the dependent must reside with the
DoD employee or contractor, id. § 3267(2)(B), and must not be a national or resident of
the host nation, id. § 3267(2)(C).
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2. Gaps in the Original Text
Even though the MEJA filled a gap in U.S. law, it was not without
its own holes. Although not the only flaw,68 the primary problem with
the MEJA was its inapplicability to persons affiliated with a federal
agency other than the DoD.69  The importance of the problem was
recognized long before the Nisour Square incident in September 2007,
but the gap grew wider as other federal agencies expanded their use of
civilian contractors abroad.70 Furthermore, the principle at the heart of
the MEJA--closing the existing jurisdictional gap for American
wrongdoers overseas-was not limited or unique to citizens affiliated
with the DoD.71 One of the MEJA's drafters, Glenn Schmitt, later
explained that Congress "simply never considered" expanding the
MEJA's application beyond DoD-affiliated persons.72 According to
Schmitt, this flaw was raised by the State Department "a few months
68. See Andrew D. Fallon & Theresa A. Keene, Closing the Legal Loophole?
Practical Implications of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 51 A.F. L.
REv. 271, 275, 283-89 (2001) (discussing practical problems of MEJA's enforcement and
MEJA's exclusion of persons who are residents or nationals of the host nation and most
persons prosecuted by a host nation without regard to the effectiveness or severity of the
prosecution); Jackson, supra note 34, at 267 (describing challenges of prosecutorial
delegation between DoD and Department of Justice); Glenn R. Schmitt, The Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act: The Continuing Problem of Criminal Jurisdiction Over
Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces Abroad-Problem Solved?, ARMY LAW., Dec.
2000, at 1, 9 (identifying several issues not addressed by the MEJA including the
military's role after arrest, method of selection of U.S. Attorney to handle a case that
originates outside all federal judicial districts, method of appointment of federal
magistrates for pre-trial proceedings, and venue); Mark J. Yost & Douglas S. Anderson,
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000: Closing the Gap, 95 AM. J. INT'L
L. 446, 453 (2001) (expressing concern about implementation of the MEJA and
acknowledging the MEJA's effectiveness will depend on the political will of the U.S.
government because the MEJA "merely provides a legal basis" for prosecution of limited
class of offenses, does not obligate Department of Justice to prosecute, and does not
affect prosecutorial discretion). In addition to these problems of application and
enforcement, Captain Anthony Giardino identified the MEJA's gap for assault in the
context of prisoner interrogation by private contractors. See Giardino, supra note 43, at
731-34.
69. See discussion infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
70. See ELSEA & SERAFINO, supra note 51, at 5-9 (discussing DoD and State
Department's use of private security contractors in Iraq); Jackson, supra note 34, at 258-
61 (describing Iraq as the turning point in the growing use of private security
contractors); see also Griffin, supra note 31 (explaining the State Department's personal
security contract which totals almost $571 million annually and employs 1261 people in
Iraq alone).
71. Indeed, Glenn Schmitt acknowledged that "[a]ll the justifications for enacting
the new law with respect to DoD personnel and their family members also apply with
respect to State Department personnel and their dependents." See Schmitt, supra note 35,
at 133.
72. See id.
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after the Act had been in effect., 73  Citing the thousands of State
Department employees assigned overseas and a concern that unspecified
crimes committed by these employees or their dependents would escape
prosecution even under the MEJA, representatives of the State
Department proposed expanding the MEJA to cover State Department
employees and their family members accompanying the employees
abroad.74 Although the MEJA was not amended at the time,75 Congress
did expand the definition of "employed by the Armed Forces" in 2004,76
attempting to close this pesky jurisdictional gap.
3. 2004 Amendment
Effective October 28, 2004,77 the definition of persons covered by
the MEJA was expanded to close the most glaring gap in the original
text: non-DoD civilians.78 Although the 2004 amendment retained the
73. See id. In his description of the justification for applying the MEJA's provisions
to State Department employees, Schmitt identifies a problem unique to State Department
employees: diplomatic immunity. See id. at 134. "Further, because the option of host
nation prosecution is entirely prevented as to State Department personnel who are given
diplomatic immunity (unless our government chooses to waive it) applying the Act to
these persons might even be more important [than for DoD employees]." Id.
74. Schmitt, supra note 35, at 133. Notably, according to Schmitt's account, the
proposal by State Department representatives would only have extended to these two
categories of persons and, apparently, not to State Department contractors and their
employees. See id.
75. Schmitt states the reason for inaction at the time was a hesitation by legislative
staffers to amend the MEJA so soon after its enactment. See id. at 134. Instead, the
legislative staffers wanted to wait until the MEJA "had been used on at least a few
occasions" and afford an opportunity for constitutional challenges to the Act. Id.
Although Schmitt later argued that expanding the MEJA to include "all American
government employees stationed abroad and their family members who accompanying
[sic]," he believed Congress should do so only at the appropriate time. Id. Notably,
Schmitt did not explicitly include non-DoD contractors in the class of persons that should
be included in an expanded MEJA. In 2004, Congress passed such an expansion,
including in the definition of "employed by the Armed Forces" not only DoD employees
and DoD contractors but also employees of all federal contractors if their work "relates to
supporting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas." See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1)
(Supp. V 2005); see also infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the amended language).
76. See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 1088, 118 Stat. 1811, 2066-67 (2004) (expanding MEJA's
class of covered persons); see also infra Part III.B.3.
77. See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act § 1088.
78. Many commentators credit the Abu Ghraib scandal as the impetus behind the
2004 legislation that expanded the MEJA's applicability. See, e.g., Glenn R. Schmitt,
Amending the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000: Rushing to Close an
Unforeseen Loophole, ARMY LAW., June 2005, at 41, 42-43; Stein, supra note 12, at 598-
99; Giardino, supra note 43, at 716-17 (noting applicability of the MEJA to non-DoD
contractors "received a good deal of scrutiny" during the Abu Ghraib investigation,
resulting in the passage of the amendment to the MEJA in 2004). This attribution is due
to the fact that some of the personnel accused of mistreating detainees at Abu Ghraib
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two categories-persons either employed by or accompanying the
military overseas-the definition of "employed by" was expanded to
include private contractors who contracted with federal agencies other
than the DoD 79 and expressly limited the definition of "accompanying"
to dependents of persons affiliated with the DoD.80 Rather than limiting
"employed by the Armed Forces" to persons affiliated with DoD,8' the
new language also extended to civilian employees of federal agencies
other than DoD,82 contractors with "any other Federal agency, or any
provisional authority,"83 and employees of such contractors.84
The definition, although expanded, included a new caveat. A
person may be subject to the MEJA if they are affiliated with 85 a non-
DoD federal agency, but only to the extent their employment with the
federal agency "relates to supporting the mission of the Department of
were operating under a contract with the U.S. Department of the Interior and, thus, they
were not covered under the original MEJA language that was limited to DoD contractors.
See Renae Merle & Ellen McCarthy, 6 Employees From CACI International, Titan
Referred for Prosecution, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2004, at A18, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33834-2004Aug25.html; see also
discussion supra Part III.A. 1-2 (explaining the original MEJA language).
79. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(l)(A) (Supp. V 2005) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3267(l)(A)
(2000)); see also 32 C.F.R. § 153.5(a)(5)(iv) (2005).
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(2) (2000). This section provides:
The term "accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States"
means-
(A) a dependent of-
i. a member of the Armed Forces;
ii. a civilian employee of the Department of Defense (including a
nonappropriated fund instrumentality of the Department); or
iii. a Department of Defense contractor (including a subcontractor
at any tier) or an employee of a Department of Defense contractor
(including a subcontractor at any tier);
(B) residing with such member, civilian employee, contractor, or
contractor employee outside the United States; and
(C) not a national of or ordinarily resident in the host nation.
Id. Therefore, the MEJA's amended language forecloses an argument a non-DoD
contractor or its employee is subject to the MEJA because they were "accompanying the
Armed Forces outside the United States." The only available line of argument is that the
non-DoD contractor falls within the MEJA's expanded definition of "employed by the
Armed Forces." See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1) (Supp. V 2005); see also infra Part V.A.2
(applying the MEJA to the Blackwater shooters).
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(l)(A) (Supp. V 2005) (limiting definition to persons
affiliated with Department of Defense).
82. Id. § 3267(l)(A)(i)(II).
83. Id. § 3267(l)(A)(ii)(II).
84. Id. § 3267(l)(A)(iii)(II).
85. The phrase "affiliated with" is used here to describe the MEJA's inclusion of
employees of such non-DoD federal agencies as well as contractors, subcontractors, and
employees of contractors and subcontractors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(l)(A).
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Defense., 86 Under this definition of persons covered by the MEJA, the
Blackwater employees involved in the Nisour Square incident fall within
the provisions of the MEJA only if their employment under a State
Department contract supports the mission of the DoD.
B. Court-Martial For Civilian Contractors
Even after the passage of the MEJA, the means for accountability
over private contractors associated with military operations was less than
clear. 88 Scholars suggested the appropriate means to try quasi-military
personnel rested with military courts-martial.89 Critics of this approach
argue subjecting American civilians to the military justice system would
deprive the civilian defendant of their constitutional rights,90 improperly
shift judicial power from Article III courts to an Article I body,91 and
offend existing Supreme Court jurisprudence.92  These objections
notwithstanding, Senator Lindsey Graham93 successfully proposed an
86. Id. § 3267(1)(A)(i)(II) (relating to a civilian employee of a non-DoD federal
agency); id. § 3267(l)(A)(ii)(II) (relating to a non-DoD federal contractor); id.
§ 3267(1)(iii)(II) (relating to an employee of a federal contractor).
87. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(l)(A)(iii)(II). Notably, the 2004 amendment modifies the
MEJA's definition of "employed by" and not its definition of "accompanying." Compare
18 U.S.C. § 3267 (Supp. V 2005), with 18 U.S.C. § 3267 (2000). This expands the
MEJA's coverage to cover civilian employees of a non-DoD agency, contractors with a
non-DoD agency, and employees of a non-DoD agency. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267 (Supp. V
2005). The expansion does not extend the MEJA's reach to dependents of non-DoD
contractors or dependents of employees of non-DoD contractors. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3267(2)(A) (2000) (covering dependents for DoD affiliated persons but not dependents
of persons affiliated with non-DoD agencies).
88. Furthermore, the lack of enforcement under the MEJA was an impetus behind
Congress's decision to find another means of prosecution for the narrow group of persons
who fit in the jurisdictional gap described herein. See Marcia Coyle, Iraq Contractor
Problems Pose Legal Puzzle, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Pa.), Oct. 29, 2007, at 4.
89. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 50; Lawrence J. Schwarz, The Case for Court-
Martial Jurisdiction Over Civilians Under Article 2(A)(10) of the Uniform Code Of
Military Justice, ARMY LAW., Oct.-Nov. 2002, at 31.
90. See Jackson, supra note 34, at 269 (identifying the rights afforded to citizens by
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
91. See Peters, supra note 50, at 405-06 (briefly discussing the objection to court-
martial jurisdiction over civilians on the basis of separation of powers and rebutting this
argument).
92. See Jackson, supra note 34, at 269. But see generally Peters, supra note 50, at
398-411 (rebutting many objections to court-martial jurisdiction over private military
contractors).
93. Senator Graham is a Republican from South Carolina. "About Senator Graham:
Biography," http://lgraham.senate.gov/public/index.cftn?FuseAction=AboutSenator
Graham.Biography (last visited Feb. 8, 2008). In addition, it is relevant and important to
note that Senator Graham was previously an active duty Judge Advocate General
("JAG") officer in the United States Air Force and he remains a Reserve JAG officer, the
only U.S. Senator currently serving in the Armed Forces. See id.
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amendment to a defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 200794 that
experts claim allows military panels to hear and decide peacetime claims
against civilian contractors.
95
Application of the UCMJ to civilians is not only a longstanding
practice, but is also explicitly authorized by the UCMJ. 96 The Supreme
Court has recognized the practice, but it has consistently limited its
application.97  More specifically, the statements of the Court on the
matter can be best described as skeptical and cautious.98 The Court,
however, has yet to consider the UCMJ's applicability to private military
contractors.99 This portion of the Comment discusses the Graham
Amendment and its implications for the Blackwater incident-a factual
scenario that would present the Court with the test case needed 00 to
clarify the scope and constitutionality of court-martial jurisdiction for
civilians employed by private military contractors.
94. See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub.
L. No. 109-364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2083, 2217 (2006). The provision read:
SEC. 552. CLARIFICATION OF APPLICATION OF UNIFORM CODE OF
MILITARY JUSTICE DURING A TIME OF WAR.
Paragraph (10) of section 802(a) of title 10, United States Code (article 2(a) of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice), is amended by striking "war" and
inserting "declared war or a contingency operation."
Id.
95. See generally Jackson, supra note 34; Giardino, supra note 43, at 718; Silliman
interview, supra note 7; Talk of the Nation: The Role of Private Contractors in Iraq
(NPR radio broadcast Sept. 19, 2007) (interviewing Dr. Sarah Percy of Merton College,
Oxford, England, author of MERCENARIES: THE HISTORY OF A NORM IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (2007); Jeremy Scahill, see supra note 29; and Paul Wood of GardaSecurity,
a risk management firm).
96. See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a) (2000) (defining "persons" subject to court-martial
jurisdiction, of which a subset are enlisted personnel).
97. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1955) (rejecting application of the UCMJ
to civilian spouses accompanying a soldier overseas in peacetime, even in capital cases).
98. See Jackson, supra note 34, at 257 (describing Court's treatment as narrow
construction).
99. See generally Jackson, supra note 34 (analyzing the unique problems the modern
"civilian-soldier" poses for application of Supreme Court precedent).
100. Commentators on the subject agree it is difficult to predict the outcome until the
Court actually hears and decides a case. See, e.g., ELSEA & SERAFINO, supra note 51, at
19-23; Jackson, supra note 34, at 258. When this Comment was written, however,
application of court-martial jurisdiction was not publicly discussed; rather, the F.B.I. was
investigating the incident for possible criminal charges in the criminal justice system.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4. If, however, criminal charges cannot be brought-
for example, because of the jurisdictional ambiguities identified and discussed in this
Comment-court-martial jurisdiction may be considered and legal scholars and
practitioners may receive the desired consideration by the Court.
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1. Textual Analysis of the Graham Amendment
In a mere five words 0 1 the Graham Amendment expanded the
UCMJ 10 2 to apply court-martial jurisdiction to civilian conduct during a
broad range of military conflict. 10 3 Article 2 of the UCMJ defines the
persons covered by the UCMJ's provisions or, described another way,
persons subject to court-martial jurisdiction.10 4 By its meager terms, the
Graham amendment expanded Article 2(a)(10) of the UCMJ,0 5 which
subjects persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the
field to the provisions of the UCMJ. 10 6 Previously, the provision only
applied to such persons "[i]n time of war."'10 7 The Graham Amendment
applies the UCMJ to such persons in time of "declared war or a
contingency operation."'10 8 Thereby, Congress bypassed a longstanding
court decision limiting court-martial jurisdiction for civilians to times of
declared war only,109 drawing within the UCMJ's scope civilians
"serving with or accompanying an armed force" during a military
operation even if it is not authorized by a formal declaration of war by
Congress.'10
101. This theme-short amendment, significant effects-is reflected in Katherine
Jackson's authoritative article on the Graham Amendment. See Jackson, supra note 34.
102. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-941 (2000).
103. As discussed herein, the amendment effectively overruled the court's holding in
United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363 (1970), available at 1970 WL 7355 (holding
UCMJ only applied to civilians in a time of "war" as declared by Congress). See infra
notes 109-10 and accompanying text; see also Jackson, supra note 34, at 277-78
(explaining Averette); id. at 279-89 (discussing the effect of the Graham Amendment).
104. See 10 U.S.C. § 802 (2000).
105. See id. § 802(a)(10).
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L.
No. 109-364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2083, 2217 (2006); see supra note 94 (quoting text of
amendment).
109. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363 (1970), available at 1970 WL 7355
(holding UCMJ provision that authorized court-martial for civilians in "time of war" only
applied during a formal war as declared by Congress).
110. See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act § 552 (amending UCMJ to
authorize court-martial jurisdiction for civilians during a "war" or "contingency
operation"); see also 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13) (2000) (defining the term "contingency
operation"); infra note 323 (quoting text of § 101 (a)(13)). The importance of this change
is illustrated by the nature of American military operations since World War II, the last
military conflict authorized by a declaration of war by Congress. Although Congress has
not declared war, the U.S. military has been engaged in armed conflict during each of the
intervening decades. In light of this, any provision conferring court-martial jurisdiction
over civilians only in time of declared war would likely be a nullity. The Blackwater
incident illustrates this fact because the Iraq "war"--like the operations in Afghanistan
after September 11, 2001, the first Gulf "War," the Vietnam "War," Korean "War," Cold
"War," and countless other military activities during the 20th century-was not an
operation conducted pursuant to a congressional declaration of war. Therefore, without
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2. Jurisprudence Disfavoring Military Court Jurisdiction over
Civilians
The longstanding precedent rejecting broad application of court-
martial jurisdiction to American civilians has been recounted and
analyzed by many scholars."' Although it would be nearly impossible to
improve upon or match these efforts, a short summary of the two most
relevant cases is helpful.
In United States v. Averette," 2 the United States Court of Military
Appeals ("CMA") addressed the threshold issue common to any criminal
prosecution of a U.S. Citizen for unlawful actions in Iraq." 13 In Averette,
a civilian contractor was charged for criminal conduct that occurred
while he worked on an Army base in South Vietnam." 4  The CMA
dismissed the charges on the grounds that the UCMJ's application to
civilians was limited to a "time of war."'" 5 The court interpreted that to
mean a war as formally declared by Congress" 16 and because the military
operations in Vietnam were not pursuant to a congressional declaration
of war, the UCMJ was not applicable to Averette, a civilian." 7 It is this
distinction that the Graham Amendment seeks to avoid or overturn by
legislative amendment of the UCMJ."8
The distinction between war and peace is also reflected in the
Supreme Court's leading case on application of court-martial jurisdiction
to civilians. In Reid v. Covert,119 the Court considered the
constitutionality of two similar court-martial proceedings where wives of
military officers were charged with murdering their enlisted husbands.'
20
Ms. Covert, not a member of any branch of the Armed Forces, was
either the Graham Amendment's explicit expansion of the UCMJ's reach or a Supreme
Court ruling contrary to Averette, the Blackwater shooters would not be subject to court-
martial jurisdiction. Because, however, the Graham Amendment expanded the class of
persons covered by the UCMJ, the Blackwater shooters may be subject to court-martial
jurisdiction if a court determined they were "serving with or accompanying an armed
force" during a contingency operation as defined by § 101 (a)(13).
111. E.g., Jackson, supra note 34, at 269-78; Peters, supra note 50, at 388-90, 394-97;
Stein, supra note 12, at 582-90.
112. 19 C.M.A. 363 (1970).
113. Id.
114. See Peters, supra note 50, at 394.
115. Averette, 19 C.M.A. at 365 (interpreting section 802(a)(10) of the UCMJ); see
also supra notes 107, 110 and accompanying text (discussing "war" in the context of
§ 802(a)(10)). But see Averette, 19 C.M.A. at 366 (Quinn, C.J., dissenting) (arguing
against the majority's construction of the term "war" as applied to the Vietnam conflict
where "sufficient congressional participation is present").
116. Averette, 19 C.M.A. at 365.
117. Id. at366.
118. See supra notes 103, 107-10 and accompanying text.
119. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S 1 (1955).
120. Id. at 3.
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charged with killing her husband while he was stationed at an airbase in
England. 121 The Air Force tried her under the UCMJ before a panel of
officers.
122
In holding the proceeding violated Ms. Covert's constitutional
rights, the Court recognized a limited power to try civilians in military
courts but the Court linked this "war power" to the unique circumstances
of the battlefield. 23 If, however, the offense did not occur within the
aura of war, the Court indicated that court-martial jurisdiction for
civilians would be inappropriate. 124  Foreshadowing or creating the
jurisdictional gap addressed by the MEJA, the Court concluded that
family members of military personnel stationed abroad were not subject
to the UCMJ. 125 The Court reasoned that although Congress may use its
regulatory power to infringe on the rights of members of the Armed
Forces, that power does not extend easily to other citizens.
1 26
The Court's opinion in Reid may help determine whether the
Blackwater shooters would be appropriate subjects of court-martial
jurisdiction, but it also provides persuasive fodder for opponents of
court-martial jurisdiction for civilians. 127  The Court's extensive
historical analysis and emphatic language are convincing. The opinion,
however, leaves the door open to a highly relevant situation where
military courts may exert jurisdiction over a civilian: conduct in an area
of active hostilities. 128  In spite of the Graham Amendment, the
constitutionality of court-martial jurisdiction for a private military
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 33 (emphasizing "area where active hostilities were under way at the time"
of the conduct). See also Jackson, supra note 34, at 277 (discussing Reid).
124. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 33.
125. See Reid, 354 U.S. 1
126. See id. at 46.
127. See id. at 35 ("The exigencies which have required military rule on the
battlefront are not present in areas where no conflict exists. Military trial of civilians 'in
the field' is an extraordinary jurisdiction and it should not be expanded at the expense of
the Bill of Rights."); id. at 38-39 (describing substantive differences between military law
and civilian law); id. at 39-41 (closing with passionate defense of decision, citing danger
of incremental encroachment of military influence over civilian life); see also Jackson,
supra note 34, at 277 & n.147 (noting that Reid indicated the "military's business is in
training soldiers and fighting wars, not prosecuting civilians for criminal offenses" and
the court-martial system does not emphasize individual rights); id. at 283-87 (arguing the
Graham Amendment extends "too far into the civilian realm" to satisfy the Court's
statements on military justice applied to civilians). But see Peters, supra note 50, at 395-
96 (noting that Reid did not involve a civilian "in the field" and emphasizing the Court's
dicta regarding wartime exception that would allow court-martial jurisdiction over
civilians in war zone).
128. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 33-35; see also Peters, supra note 50, at 395-96
(highlighting language in Reid opinion that distinguished civilians operating in a war
zone from those not in an area of active hostilities).
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contractor in Iraq remains unclear. 129 But, the Graham Amendment's
disregard for longstanding legal doctrine increases the likelihood that a
case will find its way onto the Court's docket at some point, hopefully
clarifying the reasoning of Reid and the scope of Averette.
This discussion of the applicability of U.S. law to the Blackwater
shooters does not foreclose all options for prosecution of those persons
involved in the Nisour Square incident. It is also important to determine
if Iraqi law affords an avenue to justice for the victims.
IV. PROSECUTION UNDER IRAQI LAW
Beyond the possibility of prosecution in American courts lies the
threat that Blackwater employees will be charged with crimes in Iraq.
130
If the prospect of a jury of fellow Americans is disturbing to the suspects,
the thought of facing a jury of Iraqis must seem to be a near-certain death
sentence. Central to the question of whether Blackwater employees will
be subject to Iraqi law is the struggle to determine what law applies in
post-Saddam Iraq131 and whether an order issued by the CPA insulates
contractors like Blackwater from liability.1
32
A. Law in Post-Saddam Iraq
To an observer familiar with the American legal system, the Nisour
Square incident appears to present a case of homicide: an actor killed
another person. 33 But the laws and legal system of Iraq-before, during,
or after Saddam Hussein-are not so easily compared to their American
counterparts. The more fundamental question remains: what law was in
force at the time of the Blackwater shooting on September 16, 2007?
The fall of Saddam's government in March 2003 created
uncertainty and a temporary legal vacuum. The CPA was created to
129. See sources cited supra note 100 (noting the difficult and complex questions
involved make prediction of Court's treatment hard to ascertain).
130. See James Glanz & Sabrina Tavemise, Security Firm Faces Criminal Charges in
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, at 11, available at 2007 WLNR 18642616.
131. See discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
132. See infra Parts IV.C, V.A.I (discussing possible immunity for contractors in
Iraq).
133. According to the Model Penal Code ("MPC"), a framework for many of the
criminal laws in U.S. jurisdictions, a person commits "criminal homicide if he purposely,
knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human being." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.1(1) (1962). The MPC divides criminal homicide into three
categories: murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. Id. § 210.1(2). The proper
classification will depend on the circumstances of the incident and the actor's state of
mind. Compare id. § 210.2 (requiring the actor act purposely or knowingly for
classification as "murder"), with id. § 210.3 (requiring actor act recklessly for
"manslaughter"), and id. § 210.4 (requiring actor act negligently for "negligent
homicide"). For definitions of each state of mind, see id. § 2.02.
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manage the post-invasion reconstruction efforts and the establishment of
an Iraqi government. 134 To accomplish these challenging goals, the CPA
had the power to issue new laws and regulations until the Iraqis
established a self-sustaining government. 135  According to the CPA's
inaugural regulation,
Unless suspended or replaced by the CPA or superseded by
legislation issued by democratic institutions of Iraq, laws in force in
Iraq as of April 16, 2003 shall continue to apply in Iraq insofar as the
laws do not prevent the CPA from exercising its rights and fulfilling
its obligations, or conflict with the present or any other Regulation or
Order issued by the CPA.1
36
Therefore, even after the fall of Saddam Hussein's government, the
existing laws remained in effect unless otherwise altered or repealed by
the CPA.' 37
B. Iraqi Penal Code
Specifically addressing the question of applicable criminal laws in
post-Saddam Iraq, the CPA issued Order No. 7.138 According to Order
No. 7, the provisions of the Iraqi Penal Code of 1969139 remained almost
fully intact.1 40  Order No. 7 "suspended" two provisions of the Penal
Code that criminalized dissent or anti-Saddam activities.141 Although the
CPA further amended the Penal Code's applicability, 142 the Penal Code's
relevant provisions remained in effect at the time of the Blackwater
incident and, therefore, would form the basis for any criminal
134. See generally COAL. PROVISIONAL AUTH., AN HISTORIC REVIEW OF CPA
ACCOMPLISHMENTS (2004), http://iraqcoalition.org/pressreleases/20040628-
historic review cpa.doc (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
135. See CPA Regulation No. 1, May 16, 2003, available at http://www.iraqcoal-
ition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAREG 1 The CoalitionProvisionalAuthority-.pdf.
136. Id. § 2.
137. Id.
138. See CPA Order No. 7, June 9, 2003, available at http://www.iraq
coalition.org/regulations/20030610_CPAORD_7_PenalCode.pdf. This Order was
subsequently treated as "amending" the Iraqi Penal Code and, thus, as a part of the Penal
Code. See CPA Order No. 31, Sept. 10, 2003, available at http://www.iraq
coalition.org/regulations/2003 0921 CPAORD3 1.pdf (defining "penal code" as Iraqi
Penal Code of 1969 "as amended including... CPA Order Number 7").
139. IRAQI PENAL CODE (1969), available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/
hussein/docs/IraqiPenalCodeofl969.pdf.
140. See CPA Order No. 7, supra note 138, § 2.
141. See id. (striking paragraphs 200 and 225 of the Iraqi Penal Code).
142. See CPA Order No. 31, supra note 138 (modifying the Penal Code sentencing
provisions for certain specific offenses-including kidnapping and rape-that posed a
significant problem during the reconstruction).
[Vol. 17:1
REINING IN RAMBO
prosecution in an Iraqi court. 143 The question of Blackwater's criminal
liability in Iraq does not merely depend on whether the CPA left the
previous Iraqi criminal laws in place, however, because the CPA may
have insulated Blackwater and other private contractors in Iraq from any
legal liability in the Iraqi courts.
C. Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17
In June 2004, the CPA released an Order under the innocuous title
"Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority, [Multi-National Force]-
Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq.' ' 144 Although unnoticed at
the time, this Order granted immunity from legal liability to a wide swath
of contractors operating in Iraq. 145  The Order explicitly sought to
"clarify the status" of personnel assisting in the reconstruction of Iraq
after the end of the U.S. military offensive. 14
6  L. Paul Bremer, 147
Administrator of the CPA, 148 issued the Order "under the laws and
usages of war, and consistent with relevant U.N. Security Council
resolutions." 149  The Order specifically cited United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 1483 (2003),150 1511 (2003),151 and 1546 (2004).152
1. Persons Covered by Order 17
In light of its purpose to clarify the status of personnel associated
with the occupation, rebuilding, and transitional period in post-Saddam
Iraq, 153 the broad definition of persons covered by the Order is
143. The Iraqi Interior Ministry report on the Blackwater incident specifically stated
the Iraqi Penal Code should be applied to the shooters. See Glanz & Rubin, supra note
23; Glanz & Tavemise, supra note 130.
144. See CPA Order No. 17, June 27, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.iraq
coalition.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD 17_StatusofCoalitionRev with_
AnnexA.pdf.
145. See CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144.
146. See id. at 1.
147. For biographical information, see Biographies, http://www.cpa-iraq.org/bios/
(last visited Feb. 9, 2008). Coincidentally, Administrator Bremer's personal security
detail was comprised of Blackwater contractors. See Peter W. Singer, Outsourcing War,
FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2005, at 119, 127, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/
20050301 faessay842 11 /p-w-singer/outsourcing-war.html (describing tasks performed by
private security contractors in Iraq and indicating parenthetically "Ambassador Paul
Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, was protected by a Blackwater
team that even had its own armed helicopters.").
148. See CPA Regulation No. 1, supra note 135, at 1 (describing the powers of CPA
and vesting these powers in the CPA Administrator).
149. CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, at 1.
150. S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
151. S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003).
152. S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004).
153. See CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, at 1.
2008]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
reasonable. The Order distinguished between the multinational force, 154
multinational force personnel, 55 CPA personnel, 56 contractors, 57 private
security company contractors, 58 foreign mission liaison personnel, 159
international consultants,' 60  and the Iraqi interim government.' 6'
Although each category of personnel is defined individually, many of the
Order's substantive provisions apply to most or all of these distinct
characters involved in the rebuilding of Iraq.' 62 Notably, the status of
"contractors" warranted its own section of provisions. 63
2. Scope of Immunity
Section 4 of CPA Order 17 accomplishes three primary goals:
providing requirements for registration with a centralized governmental
body, 164 establishing particularized choice of law, 165 and granting partial
legal immunity to contractors.
66
The power of section 4 lies in the following language:
Contractors shall be immune from Iraqi legal process with respect to
acts performed by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a
Contract or any sub-contract thereto. Nothing in this provision shall
prohibit [Multi-National Force] Personnel from preventing acts of
serious misconduct by Contractors, or otherwise temporarily
detaining any Contractors who pose a risk of injury to themselves or
others, pending expeditious turnover to the appropriate authorities of
the Sending State. In all such circumstances, the appropriate senior
154. Seeid. § 1(1).
155. See id. § 1(2).
156. Seeid. § 1(4).
157. Seeid. § 1(11)-(13).
158. See CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, § l(12)(b), (14).
159. See id. § 1(7).
160. See id. § 1(19).
161. See id. § 1(18).
162. See, e.g., id. § 2(1) (granting immunity from the Iraqi legal process for the Multi-
National Force, CPA, Foreign Liaison Mission personnel, and international consultants).
"Iraqi legal process" is defined as including "any arrest, detention or legal proceedings in
Iraqi courts or other Iraqi bodies, whether criminal, civil, or administrative." See id. §
1(10).
163. See CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, § 4.
164. See id. § 4(2) (requiring compliance with CPA regulations pertaining to
registration of weapons). The registration provisions, although important, are not
relevant to this discussion.
165. See id. § 4(1) (announcing contracts shall be awarded in accordance with the law
of the Sending State); id. § 4(7) ("[T]hese provisions are without prejudice to the exercise
of jurisdiction by the Sending State. . . in accordance with applicable laws."); see also id.
§ 4(2) (stating contractors are not subject to Iraqi laws regarding contractual agreements).
166. See id. § 4.
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representative of the Contractor's Sending State in Iraq shall be
notified.
167
This provision effectively grants contractors immunity from prosecution
or civil liability under Iraqi law.' 68 Notably, Order 17 defines "Iraqi
legal process" very broadly, encompassing any and all legal
accountability. 169  There are several caveats to this immunity that are
relevant to the Blackwater incident. First, security contractors must obey
all CPA regulations. 7 ° The example given in section 4 indicates its
minimal scope: contractors must register and license their weapons.
1 71
Second, contractors "shall respect relevant Iraqi laws.' 72 Interestingly,
this caveat has its own limitation: it applies "[e]xcept as provided in this
Order [17],"' 173 which seems to return jurisdiction-if any-to the
Sending State. 174  Third, the immunity applies to "acts performed...
pursuant to the terms and conditions of a Contract. 1 75  Fourth, the
contractor's Sending State may waive the immunity. 176 Fifth and finally,
the Order leaves intact the jurisdiction of the courts of the Sending
State.
1 77
3. Contractors "shall respect relevant Iraqi laws"
In an interesting choice of language, section 4(4) of Order 17
provides that, "[e]xcept as provided in this Order, all Contractors shall
167. See id. § 4(3).
168. See CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, § 1(10).
169. See id. ("'Iraqi legal process' means any arrest, detention or legal proceedings in
Iraqi courts or other Iraqi bodies, whether criminal, civil, or administrative.").
170. See id. § 4(2).
171. See id. Under CPA Order No. 3, private contractors could obtain licenses from
the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. See CPA Order No. 3 § 3(2), Dec. 31, 2003, available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031231 _CPAORD3_REV _AMD_.pdf. If
contractors failed to do so, they faced certain penalties. See id. § 6; see also CPA
Memorandum No. 5, Aug. 22, 2003, available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030822_CPAMEMO -5 Implementation of
WeaponsControl withAnnexA.pdf (implementing CPA Order No. 3, pertaining to
weapons control).
172. See CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, § 4(4).
173. See id.
174. See discussion infra Part IV.C.3 (analyzing the "respect" provision of Order 17).
175. See CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, § 4(3). This has been cited by some as a
ground for Order 17's inapplicability to Blackwater. See Laura A. Dickinson,
Accountability of Private Security Contractors under International and Domestic Law,
ASIL INSIGHTS, Dec. 26, 2007, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/2007/12/
insights071226.html.
176. See CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, § 5.
177. See id. § 4(7); see also infra Part V.A.2-3 (analyzing the options for prosecuting
the Blackwater shooters under U.S. law).
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respect relevant Iraqi laws." 178 At least two elements of this provision
are noteworthy. First, the limiting clause "[e]xcept as provided in this
Order" all but eviscerates the provision. 179 If the effect of Order 17
insulates contractors from liability under Iraqi laws, 180 the "respect"
provision could only be a soft request rather than a hard requirement.
Although the Order asks contractors to "respect" Iraqi laws, the
contractors are immune from liability for violating or otherwise breaking
those very same laws.' 81  The provision's only strength lies in its
inclusion of CPA regulations as "Iraqi laws"' 82 which may offer the CPA
enforcement power if a contractor failed to "respect" Iraqi laws and,
thus, violated Order 17.
The use of the word "respect" is the section's second noteworthy
aspect. Order 17 does not define "respect" and, because Order 17 grants
general immunity from Iraqi legal process, we will likely never know
how it would have been interpreted. 183  Any analysis based on plain
meaning-or common sense-would conclude that "respect" is distinct
from "obey.', 184 But Order 17 does not explain whether it is possible to
"respect" while violating the law or, on the other hand, if a contractor
could breach this provision of Order 17 even if the contractor did not
break Iraqi law but demonstrated contempt for it. In hindsight, it is
apparent that the CPA could have used stronger language than "respect"
if it believed the provision would carry any weight. Because the
provision begins with a fatal and determinative exception,'85 the Order
implicitly acknowledges the provision's impotence by choosing the word
"respect" over a word with actual legal significance.
178. CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, § 4(4). According to section 4(4), "relevant
Iraqi laws" include "the Regulations, Orders, Memoranda and Public Notices issued by
the Administrator of the CPA." Id.
179. Id.; see also supra notes 164-77 and accompanying text (describing the broad
immunity offered to contractors by Order 17).
180. See CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, § 4(3) (providing "Contractors shall be
immune from Iraqi legal process .. "); see also supra notes 164-77 (describing
immunity under Order 17); infra Part IV.C.4-5 (discussing procedure for resolution of
claims against contractors and waiver of immunity).
181. See CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, § 4(3); see also supra notes 164-77 and
accompanying text.
182. See CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, § 4(4); see also supra note 178 and
accompanying text (indicating that "relevant Iraqi laws" includes CPA regulations).
183. This is especially true after the dissolution of the CPA on June 30, 2004. See
infra Part V.A. 1.b (discussing the dissolution of the CPA and the subsequent effect of its
regulations).
184. Compare WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 978 (1981) (defining
"respect" in relevant part as "to consider worthy of high regard[;] ... esteem"), with id. at
787 (defining "obey" as "to follow the commands or guidance otI;] ... to comply").
185. See supra notes 173, 179-82 and accompanying text (discussing the power of the
language "[e]xcept as provided in this Order").
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4. Waiver of Immunity
The broad immunity granted by Order 17 includes a waiver
provision. 86  Under section 5, a party or state may request that the
contractor's immunity be waived, thereby removing an obstacle to
liability in the Iraqi legal system.' 87 This request must be submitted to
the contractor's Sending State 88 for approval' 89 and must be related "to
the act or acts for which the waiver [of immunity] is sought."''
90
5. Claims against Contractors
In addition to the broad immunity afforded to contractors in Iraq,
Order 17 established the exclusive means of resolving claims against
contractors.' 9' Under the provisions of Order 17, any claims brought by
parties against contractors "or any persons employed by them for
activities relating to the performance of their Contracts" will be resolved
by the contractor's Sending State.192  The party who alleges injury to
person or property by a contractor "shall submit" their claim to the
Sending State and the Sending State will address the claim "in a manner
consistent with the Sending State's laws, regulations and procedures."'
93
This provision, taken with the Order's waiver and general bar to liability
under Iraqi law, places the burden of accountability on the Sending State.
6. Termination of Order 17
The question whether Order 17 was in force at the time of the
Nisour Square incident forms the center of the debate over possible legal
liability for the Blackwater employees involved in the September 16th
incident. If the Order was in force at the time, the American contractors
are likely only exposed to liability in U.S. courts; if, however, the Order
had expired or terminated, the Iraqi legal system may be available to
private citizens or criminal prosecution regardless of the weight and
186. CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, § 5.
187. See id. § 5(2).
188. The term "Sending State" is defined in section 1(5) of Order 17. See id. § 1(5).
If the "Sending State" declines to waive a contractor's Order 17 immunity, the "Sending
State" then serves as arbiter of any claims brought against the contractor and also holds
the power to review and "deal[] with" any claims brought against a contractor. See id.
§ 18.
189. Id. § 5(2) (noting if the waiver is granted by the Sending State, the waiver must
be "express and in writing").
190. See id. § 5(3).
191. See CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, § 18.
192. See id.
193. See id.
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scope of the immunity afforded by Order 17.194 The plain language of
the Order itself indicates the Order would terminate upon its repeal. 195
As discussed infra, however, this is contradicted by at least one other
source.196 In addition to these other sources, 197 recent actions by the Iraqi
government indicate that body's opinion of which interpretation
prevails.'
98
Section 20 of Order 17 provides:
[t]his Order shall enter into force on the date of signature ... [and]
shall remain in force for the duration of the mandate authorizing the
[Multi-National Force ("MNF")] under U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 1511 and 1546 and any subsequent relevant resolutions
and shall not terminate until the departure of the final element of the
MNF from Iraq, unless rescinded or amended by legislation duly
enacted and having the force of law.
199
Under this provision, Order 17 became effective June 27, 2004,2oo and
would terminate upon either its rescission or the "departure of the final
element of the MNF from Iraq.",20' This provision distinguishes Order 17
from other orders issued by the CPA. All other CPA orders included an
"entry into force" provision that stated, in full, "[t]his Order shall enter
into force on the date of the signature," but did not provide for the
202
order's termination.
194. See supra Part IV.C.2 (discussing scope of immunity).
195. See CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, § 20.
196. See infra Part V.A.I.b (discussing conflicting sources regarding Order 17's
termination).
197. See infra Part V.A. 1.
198. See infra notes 237-43 and accompanying text (discussing Iraqi Cabinet and
Parliament's belated efforts to rescind Order 17 after the Nisour Square incident).
199. CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, § 20.
200. CPA Administrator Bremer signed the Order on June 27, 2004. See id. at 13.
201. See id. § 20. At the time of this Comment's publication, the United States and
other members of the "coalition of the willing" are still present in Iraq.
202. See, e.g., CPA Order No. 3, supra note 171, § 8; CPA Order No. 7, supra note
138, § 6; CPA Order No. 13 § 23, Apr. 22, 2004, available at http://www.iraq
coalition.org/regulations/20040422_CPAORD 13 RevisedAmended.pdf; CPA Order
No. 22 § 12, Aug. 18, 2003, available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20030818_CPAORD 22 Creation of a -New-IraqiArmy.pdf; CPA Order No. 27 § 8,
Sept. 4, 2003, available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030904-
CPAORD_27_Establishment of the FacilitiesProtectionSvc.pdf; CPA Order No. 99
§ 6, June 27, 2004, available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20040627_CPAORD_99_JointDetaineeCommittee.pdf.
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V. ANALYSIS
A. Laws In Force on September 16, 2007
1. Iraq and Immunity
The options for prosecuting the Blackwater shooters in Iraq are
limited. Under the broad reach of CPA Order 17, contractors such as
Blackwater will escape liability in the Iraqi legal system unless the
United States waives the contractor's immunity20 3 or the immunity is
otherwise inapplicable.2 °4
a. Blackwater is a Covered Entity
Blackwater meets the elements set forth in the definitions of
"contractor" and "private security companies. 20 5 Blackwater, a North
Carolina corporation,206 is not normally resident in Iraq and it provides
security services to the U.S. Department of State.20 7 As such, Blackwater
is a "private security company" as defined by Order 17.208 Under its
contract with the U.S. Department of State,20 9 Blackwater provides
security services to the Department's diplomatic corps or, in the
language of Order 17, the U.S. "diplomatic and consular mission. 2 10
Therefore, Blackwater qualified for the legal protections afforded to
"contractors" under section 4 of CPA Order 17.
203. See CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, § 5; see also supra Part IV.C (discussing
immunity under CPA Order 17 and Sending State's power to waive the immunity).
204. For example, Order 17 is of little help to Blackwater if it was not in force on
September 16, 2007. See infra Part V.A.1.b-c (concluding Order 17 was in force at the
time of the incident and remains in force until rescinded by the Iraqi government).
Additionally, some have argued that Order 17's immunity may not insulate Blackwater
because the Order only applies to conduct within the terms of the contract and
Blackwater's excessive and that the unprovoked shooting on September 16, 2007 went
beyond their contractual responsibilities. See Dickinson, supra note 175; Posting by
Laura Dickinson to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com (Oct. 16, 2007, 1:28 EDT)
(describing the discussion about Order 17's immunity as a "red herring").
205. See CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, § 1(12), (14).
206. See MAJORITY STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM,
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT BLACKWATER USA 3 (2007) [hereinafter MAJORITY
STAFF MEMO], available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20071001121609.pdf.
207. See Griffin, supra note 31.
208. CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, § 1(14).
209. The United States is a "Sending State" under Order 17. See id. § 1(5).
210. See id. § 1(8).
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b. Order 17 Was Still in Force
After the Nisour Square incident, many commentators raised the
question of Order 17's authority in present-day Iraq.21I The urgency of
this question became more pronounced when the Ministry of Interior
released its report on the incident, concluding that Blackwater and its
employees should face criminal charges for their conduct. 2 There are at
least two sources for determining Order 17's intended termination: the
Order itself and the last sentence of the public notice announcing Order
17. Although an apparent contradiction complicates the analysis, there is
a clear answer.
(1) Contradiction
As discussed supra, the text of Order 17 indicates that the Order
would remain in effect until repealed by the Iraqi government or the
departure of the coalition forces from Iraq. 1 3 The CPA also issued a
public notice, however, that indicates that Order 17 would not remain in
effect after the dissolution of the CPA.21 4
As was a standard practice for many of its orders,215 the CPA issued
a public notice to announce the issuance of Order 17.216 The public
notice reiterates the basic tenets of Order 17: contractors are not subject
211. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 204; Alex Koppelman & Mark Benjamin, What
Happens to Private Contractors Who Kill Iraqis? Maybe Nothing, SALON.COM, Sept. 18,
2007, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/09/18/blackwater/; Silliman interview,
supra note 7.
212. See Glanz & Rubin, supra note 23; Glanz & Taverinese, supra note 130; Iraq
Demands $136M Blackwater Payout, CBS NEWS, Oct. 8, 2007, http://www.cbs
news.com/stories/2007/10/08/iraq/main3343975.shtml.
213. See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
214. The CPA was dissolved on June 30, 2004. See CPA Order No. 100, June 28,
2004, available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040628 CPAORD_
100_TransitionofLaws-Regulations 
__OrdersandDirectives.pdf (providing for
transfer of power from CPA to Iraqi transitional government on June 30, 2004); see also
Dexter Filkins, U.S. Transfers Power To Iraq 2 Days Early, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2004,
at Al, available at 2004 'LNR 5439577 (describing surprise ceremonial transfer of
power on June 28, 2004).
215. The CPA issued 12 public notices compared to 12 regulations, 100 orders, and
17 memoranda. See CPA Official Documents, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
index.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2008). The CPA described public notices as
"communicat[ing] the intentions of the Administrator to the public ... or reinforc[ing]
aspects of existing law that the CPA intends to enforce." See id.
216. See CPA Public Notice Regarding the Status of Coalition, Foreign Liaison and
Contractor Personnel, June 26, 2003, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20030626 20030626_CPANOTICEForeign.MissionCir.html.pdf (last visited Feb. 9,
2008).
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to Iraqi law and they are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their
Sending State.217
The notice, however, closes with the following: "the immunity will
only apply to acts or omissions during the authority of the CPA within
Iraq. 2 18 This language is unique: no other public notice included similar
language regarding the limited duration of an order's effectiveness.
21 9
This may reflect the similarly unique language of Order 17 compared to
all other orders issued by the CPA.220  Regardless of its novelty, the
language likely was intended to assure the public that the blanket
immunity granted to contractors would not be limitless in duration.
Given this apparent contradiction, determining which interpretation
should govern requires consideration of three factors: the relative legal
weight afforded a CPA order and its accompanying public notice, the
absence of any limitation on Order 17's effectiveness in the CPA's
transfer of power document, and the interpretation adopted by the Iraqi
government after the dissolution of the CPA. All three factors support
the conclusion that Order 17 did not expire upon the dissolution of the
CPA but would terminate only upon rescission by the successive Iraqi
government.
(2) Order v. public notice
Applying the principles of Western jurisprudence, most reasonable
people would conclude that a public notice does not trump the plain
language of the law it announces; our legal system enforces the laws, not
the press release announcing their passage. Furthermore, CPA
statements offer guidance on the issue.
In its Regulation No. 1, the CPA defined and distinguished the
various documents it would issue during its tenure.221 "Regulations shall
be those instruments that define the institutions and authorities of the
CPA. Orders are binding instructions issued by the CPA. Regulations
and Orders will remain in force until repealed by the Administrator or
superseded by legislation issued democratic institutions of Iraq.,
222
Section 3 further provides, "Regulations and Orders issued by the
Administrator shall take precedence over all other laws and publications
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. The CPA issued twelve public notices. See CPA Official Documents,
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/#PublicNotices (last visited Feb. 9, 2008).
220. Notwithstanding Order No. 17, all orders issued by the CPA contain an effective
date but do not provide for the order's termination. See sources cited supra note 202 and
accompanying text.
22 1. See CPA Regulation No. 1, supra note 135, § 3.
222. Id.
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to the extent such other laws and publications are inconsistent. 223 In
closing, section 3 mentions the "Administrator may also from time to
time issue Public Notices.,
224
Under this Regulation, to the extent the public notice announcing
the issuance of Order 17 contradicts the language of Order 17 itself, the
language of the Order prevails.225 Furthermore, section 3 of Regulation I
announces the default standard for termination of CPA orders: they
remain in effect until repealed by the CPA or superseded by legislation
enacted by the subsequent Iraqi government.226 Either way, Regulation 1
indicates that the language of Order 17 controls and, therefore, Order 17
would remain in force unless repealed by the CPA or rescinded by an act
of Iraq's government.
(3) Dissolution of CPA and Order 100
The CPA transferred authority to the Iraqi government on June 28,
2004.227 On the same day, CPA Administrator Bremer signed Order 100,
providing for the effective transfer of power from the CPA to the new
228Iraqi government. Order 100 states that all CPA orders will remain in
effect unless and until rescinded by the Iraqi government.229 Order 100
also modifies, amends, and rescinds some CPA orders, memoranda, and
regulations to reflect the transfer of power to the Iraqi government.23 °
Order 17, however, is not rescinded or modified by Order 100.231
If the CPA or Iraqi government intended that Order 17's grant of
immunity would expire upon the dissolution of the CPA, Order 100 was
the mechanism to do so. 232 Order 100 not only lacks any revision or
rescission of Order 17,233 it also expressly provides that Order 17 is
unaffected by Order 100.234 Therefore, Order 17 remained in force
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See CPA Regulation No. 1, supra note 135, § 3.
227. See Filkins, supra note 214.
228. See CPA Order No. 100, supra note 214.
229. See id. at I ("Reaffirming that the laws, regulations, orders, memoranda,
instructions and directives of the CPA remain in force unless and until rescinded or
amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law.").
230. See id. §§ 3-6.
231. See id. § 3(8) (providing that Order 100's rescission or modification of prior
orders "shall not apply to Order Number 17"); id. § 4 (rescinding other CPA Orders but
not including Order 17 in the enumerated list).
232. See CPA Order No. 100, supra note 214, at 1 (establishing the motivation behind
Order 100); id. § I (describing the purpose of Order No. 100).
233. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
234. See CPA Order No. 100, supra note 214, § 3(8).
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beyond the CPA dissolution and, according to its terms,235 is enforceable
until rescinded or superseded by the Iraqi government which assumed
responsibility for all powers held by the CPA.236
(4) Repeal by Iraq
The Iraqi government-arguably the entity most interested in Order
17's inapplicability to the Blackwater incident237 -has the authority to
repeal the CPA Order.238 Prior to the incident on September 16, 2007,
the Iraqi government did not repeal Order 17 and their subsequent
attempt to rescind Order 17 demonstrates a reluctant belief that the
immunity was in force on September 16, 2007.239
Although the Iraqi Cabinet approved draft legislation in late
October 2007, the Iraqi Parliament has not taken action on the
measure. 240 In early January 2008, an international human rights
organization renewed its public pressure on the Iraqi government to pass
the legislation.241 Although it is not clear if such a repeal would apply to
previous misconduct,242 the failure to repeal, revise, or modify the Order
235. See supra Part IV.C.6 (discussing Order 17's provision for termination).
236. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (quoting CPA Order No. 100); see
also CPA Order 100, supra note 214, at 1 ("Recognizing that the Government of Iraq will
be responsible for interpreting and implementing these laws, regulations, orders,
memoranda, instructions and directives following the transfer of full governing authority
on 30 June 2004."); CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, § 20 (extending Order 17 until
its rescission or amendment by subsequent legislation).
237. See Glanz & Tavernise, supra note 130; Rubin & Kramer, supra note 23;
Tavernise & Glanz, supra note 21 (reporting Iraqi government sought review of guards'
alleged immunity in an attempt to bring criminal charges).
238. See sources cited supra note 236.
239. The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior proposed legislation placing all contractors
under the Ministry's direct supervision. See Iraq Drafts Law on Security Companies,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A10, available at 2007 WLNR 18841280; Iraq Says Draft
Law on Private Security Firms Will Go to Parliament, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 25,
2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/25/africa/ME-GEN-Iraq-
Blackwater.php. More than a month later, the Iraqi Cabinet voted to send legislation to
Parliament explicitly rescinding Order No. 17's grant of immunity to contractors. See
Rubin, supra note 14; see also Deborah Haynes, New Iraqi Law Will Bring Tighter
Controls Over Private Security Firms, TIMES ONLINE (London), Oct. 30, 2007,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article2772974.ece; Amit R. Paley,
Iraq Moves to Repeal Immunity for Guards, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2007, at A14,
available at 2007 WLNR 21390691.
240. See supra note 239.
241. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Pass New Law Ending Immunity
for Contractors (Jan. 9, 2008), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/01/09/iraql7703.htm.
242. Although Western observers familiar with proscription against passage of ex post
facto laws would assume any such law would only apply prospectively, this presupposes
the infant Iraqi legal system subscribes to the same legal principles as the West. But see
IRAQI CONSTITUTION art. 19, cls. 2, 9-10, available at http://www.uniraq.org/documents/
iraqi-constitution.pdf (prohibiting retroactive application of the criminal laws).
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17 immunity before the Blackwater incident likely places the burden on
the U.S. government to waive the immunity.
243
c. Waiver by the United States
As described supra,2" Order 17 includes a provision whereby a
contractor's Sending State can waive the contractor's immunity,
allowing recourse to the Iraqi legal system.245  A person seeking this
waiver of immunity from the Sending State must submit a claim to the
Sending State.246 This provision complements Order 17's grant of
immunity from liability under Iraqi law.247 Although the contractor is
immune from prosecution under Iraqi law for its wrongful acts, an
aggrieved party can submit their claim to the contractor's home state for
resolution of the claim. As described by the Order's accompanying
public notice, the blanket immunity does not allow the contractor to
escape liability; rather, the Order protects contractors from liability under
Iraqi law or in the Iraqi justice system, shifting the burden of prosecution
to the Sending State.248
In the case of the Nisour Square incident, Order 17 would prevent
the Iraqi government from prosecuting or private Iraqi civilians from
asserting claims for damages against Blackwater in an Iraqi court, but the
Order arguably would not insulate Blackwater from liability under the
laws of its Sending State. Section 4 insulates contractors such as
Blackwater from liability under Iraqi law and section 18 effectively
limits recourse to submitting a claim to the United States, as
Blackwater's Sending State, for resolution of the claim in accordance
with United States law. Order 17-in force unless waived by the U.S.-
returns the focus to the existing U.S. law regarding jurisdiction and
criminal liability of Blackwater.
2. MEJA as Amended
The MEJA could support criminal charges against Blackwater
personnel, but any attempt to bring charges under the MEJA would be
243. See U.N. ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR IRAQ, HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE, HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORT 1 APRIL - 30 JUNE 2007 22-23 (urging U.S. government to take steps to ensure
prosecution of private contractors who commit crimes but who cannot be prosecuted in
Iraq under CPA Order No. 17).
244. See supra notes 186-90 (discussing Order 17's waiver provision).
245. See CPA Order No. 17, supra note 144, § 5.
246. See id.; see also id. § 18 (describing process for resolution of claims if Sending
State does not waive the contractor's immunity under section 5 of Order 17).
247. See id. § 4; see discussion supra Part IV.C.2-5.
248. See CPA Public Notice, supra note 216.
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fraught with difficulty.249 The fundamental obstacle lies in the necessary
legal argument that the Blackwater contractors acted while "supporting
the mission" of the Armed Forces.25°  Resting the shooters'
accountability on this argument is only possible under the amended
language of the MEJA.25' Prior to the 2004 amendment,252 prosecution
of Blackwater employees-State Department contractors-would have
been unthinkable.253 But, the expansion of the definition of "employed
by the Armed Forces ' '254 to include non-DoD contractors 255 removes a
prohibitive barrier and replaces it with a high hurdle.256
Blackwater personnel operated under a contract with the
Department of State to provide security for the diplomatic corps and the
United States Embassy in Baghdad.257 Under their contract, Blackwater
provided similar services in other countries. 58 Although their mode of
operations may resemble military activity, their contracted
responsibilities were distinct from the ongoing military mission in
Iraq.259 Blackwater guards did not perform law enforcement tasks.260
Blackwater's operations did not require or authorize them to track
terrorists or engage in the reconstruction of Iraq.261  Their contractual
obligation and, therefore, the outer limit of the extent of their
employment was the personal protection of Department of State
personnel who were in Iraq "engaged in their own operations
overseas." 262 Rather than acting in support of the mission of the military,
249. According to one report, the Justice Department may have reached the same
conclusion. See Risen & Johnston, supra note 4 (reporting Justice Department's
acknowledgement of serious legal obstacles to prosecution of the Blackwater shooters).
250. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1) (Supp. V 2005); see also supra Part III.A.3 (discussing
the test for applying the MEJA to non-DoD contractors).
251. See supra Part III.A.1-3 (discussing the original MEJA's scope as limited to
DoD employees and contractors, excluding persons affiliated with non-DoD federal
agencies, this gap in the law's jurisdiction, and the effort to fix the flaw by amending the
MEJA in 2004).
252. See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing 2004 amendment of the MEJA).
253. As discussed supra, the original MEJA conferred jurisdiction to persons
affiliated with DoD, not Blackwater's contracting agency, the Department of State. See
discussion supra Part III.A. 1-3.
254. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(l) (Supp. V 2005) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3267 (2000)).
255. See supra Part II.A.3.
256. See Risen & Johnston, supra note 4 (reporting that, in spite of legal obstacles,
the Justice Department believes a prosecution of the Blackwater shooters is possible).
257. See Griffin, supra note 31.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See ELSEA & SERAFINO, supra note 51, at 18 (distinguishing those covered by the
MEJA from "civilian and contract employees of agencies engaged in their own
operations overseas").
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Blackwater's role was explicitly limited to supporting the mission of the
diplomatic corps and within that mission Blackwater's support was
limited to providing personal protection services.
263
The counter-argument in favor of application of the MEJA to
Blackwater must rely on the situation in Iraq during the fall of 2007.
Perhaps the only link between Blackwater's contract and the military
mission in Iraq arises from the often-lawless nature of the environment.
The daily violence and the nature of counter-insurgency conflict blurred
the traditional lines between military, law enforcement, and the defense-
oriented protection services provided by contractors like Blackwater.
Blackwater, therefore, arguably supports the military mission in Iraq by
protecting key American personnel from harm and, when effective in
repelling an attack, Blackwater's guards deprive anti-American
insurgents an opportunity to claim victory over the American occupiers.
Taking this reasoning one step further, without Blackwater's protective
services, American military personnel would have to protect the
Embassy and diplomatic corps; this alleviation of responsibility is a form
of "support" for the military mission. But in the lawless environment of
Iraq where armed American sympathizers are a form of "support" for the
U.S. military mission, the MEJA's grant of special extraterritorial
jurisdiction for persons affiliated with our military quickly becomes too
broad for its own purpose.
The Blackwater incident illustrates in vivid detail the ambiguities of
the MEJA. After the 2004 amendment, the test for MEJA's applicability
to an individual non-DoD contractor-whether their work is performed
in support of the mission of the military overseas264-assumes precise
categorization of tasks. In spite of its shortsightedness, the original
language of the MEJA reflected a more effective separation between
DoD and non-DoD operations, explicitly limiting the outer boundaries of
extraterritorial jurisdiction to DoD affiliated persons.265 The application
of the MEJA to Blackwater, however, is especially problematic because
the nature of their contractual services provided bears little relation to the
military conflict in Iraq. Blackwater could be awarded the same contract
in any country, including a country without an active U.S. military
presence. At its essence, therefore, an argument in favor of applicability
must rest on, first, the heightened violence in Iraq as justification for
Blackwater's contract and, second, a link between the military mission in
Iraq and that heightened violence. But for the U.S. military presence in
263. See id.
264. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1) (Supp. V 2005).
265. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1) (2000), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1) (Supp. V
2005); see also supra Part III.A. 1 (discussing the original language of the MEJA).
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Iraq, there would not be heightened violence directed at the United States
Embassy and American diplomats in Baghdad. Both the Embassy and
diplomats are needed if the military mission is to succeed. Therefore, the
Blackwater guards are arguably a necessary mechanism of support for
the military mission.
3. Court-Martial
It is unlikely court-martial jurisdiction will be exercised to resolve
the Blackwater incident. This is unfortunate because this incident would
present the courts with a long-needed opportunity to address the
constitutionality of military justice as applied to civilians.266 As
Professor William Peters argued, the precedent relied upon by critics of
court-martial jurisdiction is weak.267 The Supreme Court has left open
the question of court-martial applicability to civilian contractors and has
268
never been faced with modem private military contractors.
Furthermore, the prosecution of this type of incident-involving acts of
violence in a quasi-war-zone, perpetrated by heavily-armed and highly-
trained paramilitary personnel, charged with the unenviable task of split-
second threat assessments where non-combatants and enemies are often
indistinguishable-may be most "fair" when tried within the military
justice system.269
In spite of the strong arguments on both sides, the most convincing
argument in favor of court-martial jurisdiction focuses on the need for a
competent trier of fact, prepared and capable to handle the unique case
266. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 34, at 258 ("Without the factual scenario of a
challenge to this provision [authorizing court-martial jurisdiction over civilians
accompanying the armed forces], it is difficult to know how the court might rule."). In
April 2008, the U.S. military charged a civilian under the court-martial system with
aggravated assault. See Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Charges Contractor At Iraq Post In
Stabbing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2008, at A6, available at 2008 WLNR 6409685. The
contractor, who holds both Iraqi and Canadian citizenship, allegedly stabbed another
civilian contractor on a U.S. military base in Iraq. See id. This case may shed light on
how a court will rule on the application of court-martial jurisdiction over a civilian. But
it may not raise the key question for purposes of analyzing the Blackwater shooters'
liability: whether an American civilian would be subjected to the military justice system.
267. See Peters, supra note 50, at 399-405 (providing comprehensive analysis of and
rebuttal to Averette).
268. See Jackson, supra note 34, at 283-84 (acknowledging the "evolution of
contractor roles" may impact the Court's evaluation of UCMJ applicability); Peters,
supra note 50, at 412-14 (emphasizing the modem use of private military contractors
requires an appropriate adjustment of jurisprudence to allow for equitable treatment). But
see Jackson, supra note 34, at 282 ("It does not seem likely that the Supreme Court will
see the imposition of military jurisdiction as less of a threat to individual rights
enumerated in the Constitution than it did almost half a century ago.").
269. See Peters, supra note 50, at 411 (describing unique circumstances of war zone
as important consideration in determining contractor's "peers").
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270posed by a private military contractor's conduct in a destabilized state.
Much of the criticism of application of military justice to civilians
focuses on the alleged lack of protections for the important principles
embodied in the Fifth and Sixth Amendment's rights to due process and
fair trial. 27' As the Nisour Square incident illustrates, however, the court-
martial system arguably affords private military contractors a system of
adjudication more fair than that offered by a civilian court.
It is indisputable that the Nisour Square incident occurred under
272circumstances foreign to a civilian judge or jury. One element of this
distinct set of circumstances is the fact the crimes themselves are
distinguishable from their equivalent in the civilian criminal justice
system. If the Blackwater shooters are charged in the deaths of the Iraqi
bystanders in Nisour Square, they will likely face charges of homicide.273
Any comparison of the circumstances of the September 16, 2007,
incident and the facts of a typical murder trial in a U.S. District Court
would illustrate the unique character of the former,274 a character that
may place the matter beyond the competence of the civilian trier of fact
and, thus, would infringe on the defendant's right to due process and a
fair trial. A jury of military officers,275 on the other hand, may be far
more capable to comprehend the complexities and incomparable
circumstances of the Nisour Square shooting.276 In this way, a military
270. See Peters, supra note 50, at 380 (concluding if the Red Cross and journalists
accompanying the military into war zone would be covered by the UCMJ, "paid
contractors performing military missions and engaging enemy combatants would be"
appropriately covered); id. at 372 (stating the "pragmatic realities of our contractor-heavy
Iraqi campaign... weigh[s] in favor of using courts-martial jurisdiction."); id. at 396
(quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 3 (1955)) ("From a time prior to the adoption of the
Constitution the extraordinary circumstances present in the area of actual fighting have
been considered sufficient to permit punishment of some civilians in that area but
military courts under military rules."); id. at 412-14 (concluding fairness to service
members requires comparable accountability for private military contractors).
271. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 50, at 405-11 (describing and rebutting
constitutional arguments against court-martial jurisdiction); Jackson, supra note 34, at
269, 282 (reviewing the constitutional protections absent from the UCMJ).
272. See Peters, supra note 50, at 411 (mentioning the "unique context" and "surreal
quality" of life in a zone of active combat as a consideration in debate over contractor-
defendant's right to fair trial).
273. If it is difficult to assess what charges, if any, will apply to the Blackwater
shooters, it is more difficult to evaluate the actionable evidence gathered by investigators
that will determine what degree of homicide-murder, manslaughter, negligent
homicide-will be charged. See supra note 133 (discussing the Model Penal Code's
categories of homicide).
274. See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text (providing a brief summary of the
reported chronology of events on September 16, 2007).
275. See 10 U.S.C. § 825 (2000) (defining who may serve on courts-martial); id.
§ 826 (describing the qualifications of the military judge presiding over a court-martial).
276. Peter W. Singer, an expert on private military contractors generally and, more
specifically, their role in Iraq, argues the court-martial model may be an appropriate
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court-martial may offer a private military contractor charged for conduct
during security operations in Iraq a competent fact finder.277
Competency, however, cannot be mistaken for sympathy.
If tried before a military tribunal, Blackwater guards face the
possibility the officers will have less tolerance for various arguments
raised by the defense-unbearable pressure, difficulty distinguishing
between friend and foe, and long tours in hostile territory. In addition,
the lack of adequate legal accountability for civilian contractors may be a
sore subject for many enlisted personnel. 278 While courts-martial have
convened to try servicemen and women for misconduct in Iraq,279 no
civilians have been charged for misconduct in Iraq related to the military
means for adjudicating misconduct by private contractors in the area of military
operations. See Amy Klamper, Hold Them Accountable, SEAPOWER, July 2007, at 14, 17,
available at 2007 WLNR 13543508 (quoting Singer, "[I]f a contractor shoots an Iraqi
civilian or violates the rules of engagement, [the military] want[s] something to happen,
and the military is in the best position to adjudicate it because they are familiar with the
context of a war zone."). In addition, Professor Peters cites the dual needs of maintaining
discipline and fostering a unified-uniformed and contractor-fighting morale as partial
justification for court-martial jurisdiction. See Peters, supra note 50, at 373.
Comparisons of enlisted and contractor personnel in areas of active hostilities generally
conclude that the modem U.S. military delegates traditionally military tasks to private
contractors and, from the other perspective, private contractors often complete similar or
identical operations as active duty servicemembers but for exponentially more pay. See,
e.g., Singer, supra note 147 (describing private contractors, some of whom are earning
$1000 per day, as "play[ing] military roles" and "encroach[ing]" on the traditional role
and professional identity of the enlisted military); Matt Heibel, Comment, Military Inc.:
Regulating and Protecting the "A-Team[s] " of the Post-Modern Era, 18 PACE INT'L L.
REv. 531, 535-41 (2006); Walter Pincus, U.S. Pays Steep Price for Private Security in
Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2007, at A17, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/contentlarticle/2007/09/30/AR2007093001352.html (analyzing pay received by
Blackwater security contractors for each day of work under contract with Regency Hotel
and Hospital of Kuwait, compared to per-day pay received by American soldiers).
Although this Comment does not address the equality of pay or other comparisons of
these roles, the similarity of environment and tasks should inform any analysis of the
merits of separate adjudication.
277. Cf Peters, supra note 50, at 411 (commenting on who would comprise a "peer"
for a contractor on trial for conduct in a zone of active combat and concluding a
contractor may prefer the military tribunal).
278. Cf Klamper, supra note 276, at 17; Sudarsan Raghavan & Thomas E. Ricks,
Private Security Puts Diplomats, Military At Odds, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2007, at Al,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/25/
AR2007092502675.html (discussing military personnel's frustration with presence and
behavior of private military contractors in war zone, and attributing tension to
contractors' lack of accountability).
279. See, e.g., General Clears Army Officer of Crime in Abu Ghraib Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2008, at A9, available at 2008 WLNR 591127; G.I. Is Jailed for Killing
Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2007, at A8, available at 2007 WLNR 5234746; Paul von
Zielbauer, Military Jury Acquits Army Sniper of Premeditated Murder in Killing of 3
Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, at A6, available at 2007 WLNR 22122528.
2008]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
conflict 8 ° and only one civilian contractor has faced charges for
misconduct in Afghanistan. 28 This disparity led one commentator to
observe-sarcastically and correctly-that either civilian contractors are
more conscientious and law-abiding than their uniformed peers or the
legal system is ineffective for failing to enforce the law.282 In this
context, there is no justification for treating active duty personnel and
private military contractors differently.283 Parity of treatment between
civilian and military is one concern but so, too, is the procedural fairness
that leads to the verdict.
If Blackwater guards are tried in the civilian criminal justice system,
the trier of fact's inability to adequately understand the facts may not
lead necessarily to an unconstitutionally high likelihood of a guilty
verdict.28 4 But it is also possible that a civilian trier of fact-especially a
jury-may acquit a military contractor either because they fail to
understand the unique circumstances or, alternatively and unlike a
trained military officer, they fail to understand the need for restraint and
obedience to rules of engagement.285 A military panel is more likely to
understand the unique circumstances-perhaps, personally-and weigh
280. See Jackson, supra note 34, at 260-61, 264 (citation omitted) (observing no
civilians have been prosecuted under the MEJA for conduct in Iraq). But see ELSEA &
SERAFINO, supra note 51, at 18 (citing a DOJ press release announcing the 2007 guilty
plea of a DoD civilian contractor accused of possessing child pornography while in Iraq).
281. See Giardino, supra note 43, at 721-26 (discussing United States v. Passaro, No.
5:04-CR-21 1-1 (E.D.N.C. June 17, 2004), a case involving a CIA contractor accused of
contributing to the death of a detainee in Afghanistan); see also C.I.A. Contractor Goes
To Trial in Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/08/us/08abuse.html.
282. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 34, at 264-65 (citing Peter W. Singer, Warriors for
Hire in Iraq, SALON.COM, Apr. 15, 2004, http://www.brookings.edu/articles/
2004/0415defenseindustry-singer.aspx; Peters, supra note 50, at 367, 412 (crediting
Peter Singer, supra note 147, with the observation "[e]ither every [contractor] happens to
be a model citizen, or there are serious shortcomings in the legal system that governs
them.").
283. See Peters, supra note 50, at 412, 413.
284. This likelihood arises not only out of the difficulty associated with the unique
facts of the incident and the incalculable pressures faced by the would-be defendants, but
also the general political malaise about the U.S. presence in Iraq. A civilian jury--or a
judge, for that matter-may be susceptible to the social desire to exact some measure of
control or express an opinion about the ongoing conflict in Iraq. Cf Peters, supra note
50, at 411 (observing a lack of support for the "goals of the underlying military
campaign" as one problematic characteristic of a likely civilian juror). This susceptibility
is less likely to arise among military officers who (a) would have a greater understanding
of the distinct role of private contractors and (b) are, on the whole, more immune to the
shifting political winds than the general civilian population. See 10 U.S.C. § 825 (2000)
(defining the composition of courts-martial).
285. Peter Singer cited additional problems for a U.S. Attorney trying to "sell" the
case to a civilian jury: average Americans "can't find Iraq on a map or just think any
dead Iraqi is a good one." See Singer, supra note 39.
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the individual contractor's conduct against the appropriate standards of
conduct in this environment. In this way, the private military contractor
would be measured against the ethic required of their uniformed
counterparts. This reflects the fundamental principle of due process and
it may be absent in a civilian setting.
B. A Practical Obstacle: Garrity Immunity
Beyond the fundamental question whether the Justice Department
could bring charges against the Blackwater shooters 286 is the greater
question of whether it should. The public pressure--domestically 287 and
intemationally 28 -has been great. In addition to considering whether
the statute authorizes charges, the Justice Department will also consider
the likelihood of a successful prosecution. 289 If the Justice Department
concludes federal law applies to the Blackwater shooters,29 ° the next
significant obstacle likely will be the limited immunity given to some of
the shooters during the F.B.I. investigation of the shooting.291
292According to several reports, some Blackwater employees were
given a form of limited immunity in exchange for their accounts of the
incident.293 The State Department attempted to quell the resulting storm
286. See discussion supra Part V.A.2 (discussing the MEJA's applicability to the
Blackwater shooters involved in the Nisour Square incident).
287. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, REPORT, PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS AT
WAR: ENDiNG THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY (2008), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/08115-usls-psc-final.pdf; MAJORITY STAFF MEMO,
supra note 206 (detailing findings of House committee investigation into Blackwater's
conduct in Iraq); Editorial, Prosecuting Blackwater, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, at A32,
available at 2007 WLNR 22697643; Editorial, Subcontracting the War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
1, 2007, at A24, available at 2007 WLNR 19169682; Greg Bruno, The Other Army in
Iraq, CFR.ORG DAILY ANALYSIS, Oct. 5, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication/14279/.
288. See David Clarke, U.N. Says Prosecute Iraq Contractors Who Commit Crimes,
REUTERS, Oct. 11, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/
idUSLl139534720071011; Glanz & Tavemise, supra note 130; Stephanie Nebehay,
Private Security Firms Lack Supervision in Wars: UN, REUTERS, Nov. 6, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/ featuredCrisis/idUSL06381780; Rubin & Kramer, supra
note 23; Tavemise, supra note 23; U.N. 's Ban Urges Accountability for Private Security
Firms, REUTERS, Nov. 1, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/
idUSN0 1507340.
289. See Risen & Johnston, supra note 4 (acknowledging the dual obstacles of
whether federal law applies to Blackwater and whether sufficient evidence could be
presented to prove the charges).
290. See discussion supra Part V.A.2 (applying the MEJA's provisions to the Nisour
Square incident).
291. See infra notes 292-308 and accompanying text.
292. See David Johnston, State Dept. Made Immunity Offers to Firm's Guards, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2007, at Al, available at 2007 WLNR 21341811; Karl & Radia, supra
note 8.
293. See sources cited supra note 292.
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of questions, explaining the so-called immunity did not limit prosecutors'
ability to levy criminal charges.2 94  Although this is likely true, 95 the
effect of the limited immunity may still prevent a successful
prosecution.296
As explained by law professor Byron Warnken, 297 the form of
immunity given to the Blackwater witnesses-Garrity immunity298-is
not a "free pass," insulating the informant from prosecution. 299 Rather,
Garrity immunity is a tool for the prosecutors evaluating whether to
prosecute and who to prosecute. 300 Also known as "use immunity," this
protection prevents the government from using the information gained
from the informant or evidence gathered as a result thereof.301 In
exchange for this limited immunity, a Blackwater employee can be
compelled to answer questions narrowly related to performance under
their government contract.3 °2 Therefore, even if federal law applies to
the Blackwater shooters, the Justice Department faces the difficult
scenario where the only evidence or the best evidence is off limits
because of the Garrity immunity granted during the preliminary
303investigation. Any charges brought against Blackwater will require
294. See Scan McCormack, Department of State Daily Press Briefing (Oct. 30, 2007),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/oct/94344.htm.
295. See Byron L. Warnken, Op-Ed., Blackwater, Garrity, and Immunity: What Does
It All Mean?, JURIST-FORUM, Nov. 12, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/
2007/1 1/blackwater-garrity-and-immunity-what.php; see also Risen & Johnston, supra
note 4 (identifying the guards' limited immunity as a practical difficulty and an obstacle
to prosecution).
296. See James Risen & David Johnston, Justice Department Briefed Congress on
Legal Obstacles in Blackwater Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2008, at A10, available at
2008 WLNR 844931 (acknowledging that Garrity immunity poses an additional problem
for prosecution of Blackwater shooters because prosecutors must find evidence
independent of guards' immunized statements and prove that any evidence gathered by
investigators "did not stem from statements made by the guards after they were promised
limited immunity"); Warnken, supra note 295 (indicating grant of Garrity immunity will
not prevent prosecution but prosecutors will only be able to use evidence "independent"
of the statements made under immunity).
297. Byron L. Warnken is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of
Baltimore School of Law. See University of Baltimore School of Law-Byron L.
Warnken, http://law.ubalt.edu/template.cftn?page=678 (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
298. Professor Warnken provides a succinct description and history of this form of
immunity that bears the name of a Supreme Court case, Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493 (1967). See Wamken, supra note 295.
299. See Wamken, supra note 295.
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. See id. Under the Garrity immunity doctrine, a government employee or
contractor may be compelled to speak without implicating their Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. See id.
303. See Risen & Johnston, supra note 4.
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evidence independent of the statements by those who received the
immunity, adding increased demand for already scant evidence.
This obstacle is especially problematic for incidents where, as here,
the statements of the immune employees would likely be the key
evidence in any criminal trial.30 4 As reported by the New York Times,
this concern is one consideration bearing on the Justice Department's
decision whether to bring criminal charges against the Blackwater
shooters.30 5 Ultimately, only the Justice Department can evaluate the
options in light of political pressures to act. As Professor Warmken
306argues, there may be "bigger fish" or, alternatively, political benefits
in a sure-albeit lesser-victory rather than risking political backlash
after an acquittal. Legislative efforts to close the current jurisdictional
gaps after the Nisour Square incident will not affect the Blackwater
shooters, but passage of effective legislation may provide political cover
to an outgoing administration 30 7 and may prevent future frustration or
injustice. That, of course, assumes that the recent legislative proposals
achieve the effective closure of the proverbial "barn door.'
30 8
304. If criminal charges are brought, the practical problems of trying a case in the
United States will be amplified by the location of evidence and witnesses in Iraq. Some
commentators have linked the lack of previous MEJA prosecutions with this very
problem. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 39 (describing the MEJA system as "hoping to
apply extraterritorial civilian law to a military setting 9000 miles away" and discussing
practical difficulties associated with U.S. Attorneys investigating and preparing to try a
criminal case arising out of conduct in Iraq). For this reason, the State Department's
grant of immunity may reflect the government's desire to achieve some measure of
success-the firing of Blackwater employees involved in the incident and termination of
Blackwater's contracts-rather than hoping for a favorable verdict in a criminal trial and
failing. See Warnken, supra note 295; see also David Johnston, Letter Tells of
Difficulties in Prosecuting Detainee Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2007, at A17, available
at 2007 WLNR 902834 (discussing prohibitive problems the Justice Department faced
trying to bring criminal charges against private contractors suspected of abusing
detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan).
305. See Risen & Johnston, supra note 4.
306. See Warnken, supra note 295.
307. The current debate has spilled over into a new calendar year-2008-that also
happens to be a presidential election year. The impact of this timing either will hinder
progress-as legislation stalls during the campaign season and as a result of election year
posturing-or the timing could serve to highlight the problem-offering the
administration's opponents yet another Iraq-related issue as election-year ammunition. In
this context, it must be noted that the sponsor of two Senate bills, each of which would
clarify the MEJA's definition of persons covered and enhance the enforcement
mechanisms, is Illinois Senator Barack Obama. See infra note 3 10.
308. See supra note 12 (crediting Fredrick Stein's effective use of the "barn door"
metaphor).
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C. Recent Developments
In response to the Nisour Square incident, 30 9 the U.S. House of
Representatives passed the MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of
2007.310 As its title suggests, the bill's language amends the MEJA to
expressly include all private contractors as a category of persons covered
by the MEJA, 311 attempting to remove the lingering doubts regarding the
MEJA's applicability to non-DoD contractors.31 2  As discussed infra,
however, it is not clear that the legislation will succeed in eliminating
this ambiguity.
1. Another Expansion of "Persons Covered"
The current language of the MEJA 313 only extends jurisdiction to
persons directly associated with the Armed Forces 314 or non-DoD
contractors "supporting the mission of the Department of Defense
309. See H.R. REP. No. 110-352, at 3-5 (2007); see also Kelley, supra note 13.
310. H.R. 2740, 110th Cong. (2007). The bill passed by a vote of 389 to 30. See
House Passes Rep. Price Contractor Bill, U.S. FED. NEWS, Oct. 4, 2007, available at
2007 WLNR 19504249. The passage of the House bill shifted focus to the Senate where
a similar bill awaits passage. See S. 2147, 110th Cong. (2007) (referred to S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, Oct. 4, 2007). The Senate version, sponsored by Senator Barack Obama, is
substantively the same as the House bill for purposes of this Comment: both bills change
the test for determining whether a non-DoD contractor is subject to the MEJA. Compare
H.R. 2740 § 2, with S. 2147 § 2. Senator Obama introduced a similar measure earlier in
2007. See Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act, S.
674, 110th Cong. (2007). The first bill, Senate Bill 674, had "more teeth." See Klamper,
supra note 277, at 16 (quoting Peter W. Singer). Senate Bill 674 enhances the
enforcement and accountability mechanisms available to the government. See S. 674
§§ 3-5 (imposing reporting requirements on federal agencies and contractors); id. § 6
(requiring federal agencies issue specific regulations and guidance on rules of
engagement, hiring and training standards, and cooperative communication between
private military contractors and the armed forces); id. § 7 (defining legal status of
contractors); id. § 8 (establishing special unit within F.B.I. for investigations in area of
contingency operations). The second bill, Senate Bill 2147, however, does not include all
of these provisions. Compare S. 674, with S. 2147 (modifying the definition of persons
covered by the MEJA and establishing a special investigation unit within the F.B.I. for
extraterritorial crimes).
311. See H.R. 2740 § 2(a).
312. See, e.g., Broder & Risen, supra note 4; Coyle, supra note 88; Silliman
interview, supra note 7.
313. The current enactment of the MEJA reflects the 2004 amendment. See 18
U.S.C. 3267(1) (Supp. V 2005); see also discussion supra Part III.A.3 (describing the
2004 amendments to the MEJA).
314. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(l)(A)(i)(I) (civilian employee of DoD); id.
§ 3267(l)(A)(ii)(I) (DoD contractor); id § 3267(l)(A)(iii)(I) (employee of DoD
contractor); id. § 3267(2)(A) (2000) (dependent of either a servicemember, DoD
employee, a DoD contractor, or an employee of a DoD contractor).
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overseas. '" 315 This requirement that non-DoD contractors are only
covered to the extent their work supports DoD's mission adds a wrinkle
to the application of the MEJA to Blackwater and their peers.31 6 But if
the existing MEJA language does not confer jurisdiction over private
military contractors operating overseas, the pending legislation attempts
to remove all doubt.31 7 Unfortunately, the new language may only create
a new grey area.
The bill passed by the House on October 4, 2007, would add
another category of persons covered by the MEJA. 318  The legislation
provides:
(a) Clarification of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act-
(1) INCLUSION OF CONTRACTORS-Subsection (a) of
section 3261 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(A) by striking 'or' at the end of paragraph (1);
(B) by striking the comma at the end of paragraph (2)
and inserting '; or'; and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
'(3) while employed under a contract (or subcontract at any tier)
awarded by any department or agency of the United States,
where the work under such contract is carried out in an area, or
in close proximity to an area (as designated by the Department
of Defense), where Armed Forces is conducting a contingency
operation,'.
(2) DEFINITION-Section 3267 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
'(5) The term 'contingency operation' halthe meaning given
such term in section 101(a)(13) of title 10.'
315. 18 U.S.C. § 3267(l)(A)(i)(II) (Supp. V 2005) (civilian employee of a non-DoD
agency); id. § 3267(1)(A)(ii)(II) (non-DoD contractor); id. § 3267(1)(A)(iii)(II)
(employee of non-DoD contractor).
316. See discussion supra Part V.A.2 (describing the analysis necessary to apply the
MEJA as in force at time of Nisour Square incident).
317. See H.R. 2740, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(C) (2007) (extending jurisdiction to the
criminal conduct of a person "employed under a contract (or subcontract at any tier)
awarded by any department or agency of the United States," so long as the work was
performed near military operations (emphasis added)).
318. See H.R. 2740; David Stout, House Bill Would Allow Prosecution of
Contractors, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 4, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/
articles/2007/10/04/america/05cong.php.
319. H.R. 2740 § 2(a).
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The new language replaces the current test-"supporting the mission of
the Department of Defense overseas" 32°-with a test that emphasizes the
location of the conduct relative to military operations.32' Although the
language proposed by the MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act322
serves to clarify this critical aspect of the MEJA-namely, who is
covered--even the new language is vulnerable to similar ambiguity.
The new language would define the outer bounds of extraterritorial
jurisdiction through reference to the location of the work performed
323hthne
rather than the identity of the contracting parties. Although the new
legislation expands the population covered by the MEJA,3 24 the new
scope of jurisdiction is still limited. The proposed legislation would
confer jurisdiction over those contractors whose "work under such
contract is carried out in an area, or in close proximity to an area (as
designated by the Department of Defense), where the Armed Forces is
conducting a contingency operation. '325 What this legislation will mean
in practical application is far from clear due to the blurred line between
320. 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1) (Supp. V 2005). Some continue to discuss this question in
terms of whether the private military contractors were "accompanying" the Armed
Forces. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 43; Silliman interview, supra note 7. This, however,
ignores the effect of the 2004 amendments. See discussion supra Parts III.A. 1-3, V.A.2.
The 2004 amendments incorporated contractors-all DoD and some non-DoD-into the
definition of "employed by the Armed Forces" and limited the definition of
"accompanying" to DoD-affiliated dependents. See § 3267(1); 18 U.S.C. § 3267(2)
(2000); see also supra notes 80, 87 and accompanying text. The effect of the 2004
amendments to the MEJA, therefore, was to exclude non-DoD contractors from the latter
category. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. With the new framework came a
new analysis: the key consideration is not the application of the term "accompanying"
but, rather, the phrase "supporting the mission" of the military overseas. See supra notes
79-86; discussion infra notes 321-32 and accompanying text; see also Silliman interview,
supra note 7 (quoting Silliman's use of the correct test).
321. H.R. 2740 § 2(a)(1). The section defines the location by reference to the DoD's
definition of a "contingency operation" as that term is defined elsewhere in the United
States Code. Id. § 2(a)(1)(C). "Contingency operation," therefore, is defined as
a military operation that-
(A) is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which
members of the armed forces are or may be become involved in military
actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or
against an opposing military force; or
(B) results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members
of the uniformed services under section 688, 12301(a), 12303, 12304,
12305, or 12406 of this title, chapter 15 of this title, or any other provision
of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the
President or Congress.
10 U.S.C. 101(a)(13) (2000).
322. H.R. 2740.
323. See id. § 2(a)(1).
324. See supra notes 317-23 and accompanying text.
325. H.R. 2740 § 2(a)(1)(C). As mentioned supra, the definition of "contingency
operation" can be found at 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13). See supra note 321.
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formal military operations and related activities such as
counterinsurgency operations, reconstruction, and training of local police
and military forces.
2. Applying the Proposed Language to Nisour Square
As illustrated by the Blackwater incident, the situation in Iraq may
not be easily or obviously defined.326 In the context of Blackwater's role
in Iraq, the issue is whether a contractor whose role is limited to
providing security for the United States Embassy and the American
diplomatic corps would fall within the scope of § 101 (a)(13)'s definition
of "contingency operation." The answer is likely "yes" under the
proposed clarification and expansion of the MEJA because the key factor
delineating contractors subject to domestic criminal jurisdiction from
those not subject to such jurisdiction is the location of work performed
and not the nature of the contract. 7
Unlike the likely outcome under the current MEJA language,328 the
Blackwater employees were operating in Baghdad at the time of the
incident but they were away from the Embassy. 329 Under the proposed
test, the Secretary of Defense could define the geographical area of the
military's "contingency operation" to include all of Baghdad or even so
broadly as to encompass the entire country of Iraq. 330 But this shift in
statutory focus may not eliminate the "grey area" inhabited by private
contractors like Blackwater. The next incident may raise new questions
of whether the conduct occurred "in an area, or in close proximity to" the
military operations331 instead of the current debate over whether
Blackwater's conduct occurred while "supporting the mission" of the
326. Although traditionally the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime would signal the end
of the military campaign and the beginning of a separate reconstruction effort, the current
conflict against insurgent combatants in Iraq-defined as part of the broader and
amorphous "Global War On Terror"-may be viewed as a "contingency operation" under
the expansive and discretionary definition in 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13). See supra note 321.
327. See supra notes 317-23 and accompanying text. Compare 18 U.S.C.
§ 326 1(a)(1) (2000) (limiting jurisdiction to a person's conduct "while employed by or
accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States"), with H.R. 2740 § 2(a)
(conferring jurisdiction over conduct "while employed under a contract.., awarded by
any department or agency of the United States, where the work under such contract is
carried out in an area, or in close proximity to an area ... (as designated by the
Department of Defense), where Armed Forces is conducting a contingency operation.").
328. See discussion supra Part V.A.2 (applying "supporting the mission" test to
Blackwater).
329. See sources cited supra notes 16-27.
330. Indeed, under the rubric of a "Global War on Terror," it is possible the
geographic scope of the military's "contingency operations" would encompass the entire
world.
331. H.R. 2740, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2007).
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332
military overseas. On the other hand, enabling the DoD to define the
geographic area returns a measure of control to the enlisted forces and
any progress in that direction will likely increase accountability,
structure, and certainty. Therefore, if the DoD defined the geographic
area broadly-for example, Iraq as a whole-Blackwater contractors
operating therein would be covered by the MEJA as amended by the
proposed language. In this sense, a criminal prosecution under the
MEJA would be easier in the case of a future incident similar to the
events in Nisour Square than under the current MEJA language.
VI. CONCLUSION
The tragedy of Nisour Square has spread to Constitution Avenue in
Washington, D.C., as Justice Department officials begin to acknowledge
the significant obstacles to justice for the seventeen Iraqis shot in
September 2007. 333 The contractors are immune from legal liability-
criminal or civil334 -in Iraq unless the U.S. government waives their
immunity.335 The search for a remedy by those interested in charging the
shooters for their excessive shooting336 must turn to the U.S. legal
system.
The relevant federal criminal statute-the MEJA-arguably does
not apply to the Blackwater employees because their State Department
contract is not carried out in support of the DoD mission overseas.33 7
Even this standard, already eased once,338 cannot extend jurisdiction to
the heavily armed paramilitary contractors who act under contracts with
non-DoD agencies. Under their contract with the State Department,
Blackwater employees perform functions limited to the State Department
mission in Iraq: they provide personal protection services to American
diplomats. 339 Their performance under this contract does not depend
upon the concurrent DoD effort in Iraq340 and, indeed, their contract
extends beyond Iraq.341
332. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(l) (Supp. V 2005); see also supra Parts II1.A.3, V.A.2.
333. See Risen & Johnston, supra note 4.
334. See supra Part 1V.C.2 (explaining Order 17's broad grant of immunity from the
Iraqi legal process).
335. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text (discussing Sending State's
power to waive a contractor's immunity).
336. See sources cited supra notes 2-3.
337. See supra Parts III.A.3, V.A.2 (describing the MEJA's scope and applying it to
the Nisour Square incident).
338. See supra Part III.A.3 (describing the 2004 amendment to the MEJA).
339. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text (describing the State Department
WPSS contract).
340. See supra Part V.A.2.
341. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 17:1
REINING IN RAMBO
Even the newest round of amendments to the MEJA's definition of
covered persons342-passed by one house of Congress after the Nisour
Square incident 343 -may not completely foreclose future disputes.
344
The proposal passed in the House and awaiting action in the Senate
345
merely changes the test346-again. The new test is an improvement: it
defines the MEJA's application to non-DoD civilian contractors in
geographic terms and not based on type of activities performed by the
individual contractors. 347  Furthermore, the proposed language would
348link the geographic scope to the DoD's specific definition of the area.
This degree of precision is absent in the current enactment and, although
there is still a possibility for ambiguity,349 the new proposal is yet another
improvement on a well-intended law.
Alternatively, the Blackwater shooters could be subject to court-
martial jurisdiction.350  This possibility is unlikely,351  which is
unfortunate because it provides a set of facts that would present the
courts with an opportunity to decisively announce the constitutionality of
court-martial jurisdiction over private military contractors.352 This
clarity is needed, as illustrated by the blurred line between the work
performed by enlisted soldiers and civilian security contractors.
353
Although predicting a future holding is impossible, there is a strong
argument in favor of assigning cases like the Nisour Square tragedy to
the purview of military courts.354
First, military court review would provide a much-needed parity of
treatment between persons who effectively perform the same tasks in
similar environments.355 As illustrated by the logical stretch needed to
342. See supra notes 318-25 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 310-12 and accompanying text.
344. See supra Part V.C (analyzing the proposed legislation to expand the MEJA's
scope).
345. See supra note 310 (discussing the Senate versions of the bill passed by the
House).
346. See supra Part V.C. 1.
347. See supra Part V.C. 1.
348. See supra notes 325, 330, 331 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes Part V.C (analyzing proposed legislation and identifying lack of
clarity).
350. See supra Parts 1II.B, V.A.3.
351. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (summarizing the progress of the
criminal investigation by Justice Department in lieu of convening a court-martial).
352. See supra Parts III.B, V.A.3 (identifying and discussing the need for clarification
of constitutionality of court-martial jurisdiction, as illustrated by the Nisour Square
incident).
353. See generally Peters, supra note 50; Singer, supra note 39; Singer, supra note
147.
354. See supra Part V.A.3.
355. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
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impose criminal justice on the Blackwater shooters,356 these private
military contractors have escaped accountability and legal liability thus
far while their underpaid enlisted counterparts are court-martialed and
discharged from their chosen career.
357
Second, although court-martial procedures are different than those
in the criminal justice system in ways that implicate important
constitutional rights,358 a court-martial setting would protect the
defendant's right to a fair trial even more adequately than a civilian
setting.359 The unique pressures and conditions facing the Blackwater
shooters in Iraq may be beyond the competence of a civilian jury.360 A
panel of military officers is better-equipped to understand the
circumstances of armed conflict, apply the appropriate standard of
conduct under the circumstances, and render a solemn verdict.361
Regardless of which-if any-of these options are used to
prosecute the contractors responsible for the Nisour Square incident, the
recent attention paid to the state of the law may prove to prevent future
362thnproblems. It may be thin, but this is a silver lining nonetheless.
356. See discussion supra Part V.A.2.
357. See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
358. See supra Parts III.B.2, V.A.3 (discussing debate over constitutionality of court-
martial jurisdiction over civilians).
359. See discussion supra Part V.A.3.
360. See discussion supra Part V.A.3.
361. See discussion supra Part V.A.3.
362. It also illustrates the thoughts of one expert: Blackwater may escape criminal
liability not because the legal framework is lacking, but because the political will to
enforce the existing laws is not strong enough. See Posting of Laura Dickinson to
Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com (Oct. 1, 2007, 9:34 EDT).
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